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ABSTRACT
The first essay estimates the degree of monopsony power in the college football labor
market. Previous literature suggests that the marginal revenue product of top performing
college football players significantly exceeds their compensation. Such estimates overstate
rents on labor because they estimate the marginal revenue product as a function of ex post
realized labor quality, which is more information than is available ex ante. For 114 Foot-
ball Bowl Subdivision participant schools from 2004-2011, I estimate the marginal revenue
product for players grouped into three ex post quality tiers. Using talent ratings prospective
players spanning 2002-2008, I then estimate the probability of each ex post quality outcome
given a prospect’s rating. Together these yield estimates of expected marginal revenue prod-
uct as a function of ex ante promise, which are more appropriate for inference regarding
monopsony power.
The second essay builds on a multi-market approach to second-degree price discrim-
ination which treats each successive unit sold by the monopolist as a separate good sold
in an independent market. For each unit of the good, the monopolist chooses a marginal
type (lowest type served) subject to a constraint: the schedule of marginal types must be
monotonically non-decreasing in the amount of the good being sold. I show that the monop-
olist’s problem can be treated like a finite horizon multi-stage decision problem, and solved
by backward induction using Bellman’s equation. This approach identifies the optimal non-
linear price schedule whether or not the monotonicity constraint binds, and highlights the
economic intuition behind the construction of an optimally ironed marginal type schedule
an the corresponding marginal price schedule.
The third essay looks at the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolist screening con-
sumers on a single type parameter, when the single crossing condition is violated. I show
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that under standard assumptions of one-dimensional screening problems, violation of the sin-
gle crossing condition can allow for positive and globally incentive compatible assignments
through which the monopolist extracts all equilibrium surplus. This sharply contrasts with
the case of second-degree price discrimination when the single crossing condition is satisfied.
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CHAPTER 1
ARE YOU HIRING JOHNNY FOOTBALL OR JOHNNY DOE? THE EFFECTS OF
UNCERTAIN LABOR QUALITY ON EMPLOYER MONOPSONY IN COLLEGE
FOOTBALL.
Few labor markets in the United States (US) have received as much media attention
and public scrutiny of late, as the market for college football players. The collegiate football
industry in the US has long been offered as an example of a monopsonistic labor market,1
primarily because National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules limit
player compensation to a full-tuition scholarship and the coverage of some additional ex-
penses, restricting wage competition among employers. In recent years, several challenges to
these rules have been mounted. For example, Gregory (2013, September 16), the cover story
of Time magazine, advocates allowing player payment beyond the current limit. In April
of 2014, football players at Northwestern University voted on the certification of a players’
union, a move which the University is presently challenging 2 In August of 2014, the NCAA
voted to allow member institutions of the “power five” conferences (65 schools in all), a
degree of autonomy in determining the amount of expenses these schools offer to cover for
athletes as part of their compensation package [see Terlep (2014, August 7)]. In January of
2015, these “power five” member schools approved adding a stipend to scholarships for 98
male athletes (85 football, 13 basketball), and a matching number of female athletes, begin-
ning in August 2015. On average, these stipends are expected to amount to $2,500 annually
1See for instance Koch (1973), Becker (1983, September 30), or Fleisher et al. (1992). I use ‘monopsony’
to broadly refer to labor markets in which a sole employer or several employers possess some degree of market
power.
2See Wolken (2014, April 24). The results of the vote are sealed and currently unknown while the legal
challenge pends.
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[see Berkowitz (2015, January 17)]. Also in August of 2014, a US District Court ruled in
the O’Bannon v. NCAA class action suit, issuing an injunction against NCAA rules that
prohibit schools from offering athletes a share of revenue generated from the commercial use
of their images or likenesses. The NCAA intends to appeal the ruling [see Romney (2014,
August 8)]. These challenges to the amateurism rules typically contend that players gener-
ate revenue for their institution which exceeds their capped compensation; and moreover,
that the imposed compensation cap reflects an exercise of monopsony power by the NCAA
member institutions, which allows them to systematically under-compensate college foot-
ball players. Despite some evidence from Brown (1993) and Brown (2011) that elite college
football players are currently under-compensated, the effect of the existing system on the
average player’s compensation, is unclear. In particular, the existing literature overstates
the degree of monopsony power exercised over elite players, by implicitly treating the future
quality of prospective labor as known at the time of hiring.
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Brown (1993) is often cited as evidence of employer monopsony in college football.3
Brown estimates that the marginal revenue product of labor (henceforth MRP) for an elite
college football player is greater than $500,000 annually, substantially more than the market
value of the typical compensation package.4 Using the 2004 to 2005 season, Brown (2011)
suggests that a premium player generates more than $1,000,000 annually. However, the data
used to generate such estimates are from a selected sample of players who went on to be
drafted in the National Football League (NFL). The majority of scholarship players partic-
ipating at FBS programs do not graduate into the NFL.5 As such, estimates based on this
select sample do not reflect the value of the average player; and for the purposes of NCAA
policy evaluation, are not applicable to the wider population of interest. More importantly,
since the elite status of these players (as defined by a future NFL draft selection) was un-
known at the time they participated in the college football labor market, the Brown (1993)
MRP estimates are inappropriate for assessing the exercise of monopsony power, even as it
relates to the most productive players in college football.
In order to assess the exercise of monoposony power, it is necessary to differentiate
information available prior to hiring (henceforth ex ante), and information available after
hiring (henceforth ex post). A monopsony rent on labor is the employer’s return on a worker
beyond what his return would be, given a competitive labor market. Wages and employ-
ment decisions are based only on the information available ex ante, and competitive wages
approach ex post realized MRP only if future labor quality is fully known ex ante. Among
college football players, ex ante promise imperfectly correlates with ex post realized quality.
Many of the ex ante most promising players are not among the ex post highest quality, and
many of the ex post highest quality players were not among the ex ante most promising. So
MRP estimates from the ex post highest quality players overstate the expected MRP of even
3See for instance Boal and Ransom (1997) or Kahn (2007).
4Brown (1993) uses survey responses from 39 Division I-A football programs for the 1988 college football
season. He correlates school football revenue with the number of players on each team that were drafted
into the NFL within four years.
5I estimate that from 2004 to 2011, eventual NFL draft picks accounted for roughly 9% of all FBS
scholarship players.
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the ex ante most promising players. Therefore, in the college football labor market (and
any other in which the future quality of labor is uncertain), a monopsony rent on labor is
appropriately defined as the difference between ex ante expected MRP and wage. The degree
of exercised monopsony power then, can be measured as the fraction of expected MRP that
employers retain as rents, following Pigou (1924).
Nonetheless, there is practical justification for following Brown (1993), following
Brown (2011), and others, in estimating marginal productivities using ex post realized qual-
ity rather than ex ante expected quality.6 Given the imperfect correlation between ex ante
promise and ex post quality, ex post quality will necessarily be a less noisy signal of a player’s
productive contribution. Thus, marginal product estimates will be more precise if estimated
using ex post realized quality as opposed to ex ante promise. MRP estimates as a function
of realized quality possess more information than employers have ex ante, and necessarily
overstate the expected value of the most promising prospective players. Consequently, infer-
ence regarding employer monopsony power necessitates that such estimates be adjusted to
reflect the ex ante uncertainty of labor quality.
For the empirical exercise, I collect a panel of annual institution-level revenue and
winning percentage data from 114 NCAA member institutions, who competed in FBS foot-
ball from 2004 to 2011. Treating on-the-field success as the output of a college football team
I first estimate team winning percentage as a function of ex post realized labor quality, and
then estimate school revenue as a function of team winning percentage. Within the institu-
tion, I proxy for differences in realized labor quality by sorting players into three separate
ex post quality tiers. Players that go on to be drafted in the NFL constitute the ex post top
tier.7 An ex post middle tier is constructed using annual rankings of NFL draft prospects
from CBS Sports.8 Specifically, this middle tier consists of players who were ranked among
6This empirical approach is adopted in Brown (1994) for men’s collegiate basketball, Brown and Jewell
(2006) for women’s collegiate basketball, and Kahane (2012) for men’s collegiate hockey.
7NFL draft results are available at: nfl.com/draft/history/fulldraft, as well as many other sources. A
total of 253 players are typically selected in each year’s NFL draft.
8Data were retrieved from http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft/prospectrankings.
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the top 500 draft prospects by CBS Sports, but not drafted. A bottom tier of all remaining
scholarship players is implied. I estimate team winning percentage as function of the number
of players a team employs within the ex post quality tiers. However, per NCAA regulations,
FBS programs may have no more than 85 scholarship players annually.9 Programs typically
operate at the limit, making a team’s annual counts of top, middle, and bottom tier players
linearly dependent. The marginal product of labor (henceforth MP) for ex post top, mid-
dle and bottom tier players are therefore, not separately estimable. Instead, the estimated
production equation identifies the difference in MP between top, middle, and bottom tier
players. I am able to correct for this issue by establishing plausible upper and lower bound
estimates for the MP of ex post bottom tier players. This yields interval estimates of MP,
and subsequently MRP, for ex post top, middle, and bottom tier players.
To account for the information schools possess ex ante, I incorporate scouting data
generated prior to player recruitment by Rivals.com.10 Using Rivals ratings for 6,604 prospec-
tive college football players recruited from 2002 to 2008, I sort players into tiers according
to ex ante promise. I estimate the probability that a player will belong to each of the ex
post quality tiers, conditional on Rivals prospect ratings which serve as ex ante forecasts
of player quality. The conditional probability and MRP interval estimates then combine to
yield estimates of expected MRP as a function of ex ante promise. These estimates permit
inference about the degree of monopsony power exercised across the college football labor
market.
The results of this paper show that labor quality in college football involves consid-
erable uncertainty ex ante. An initial picture of this labor quality uncertainty is found in
Table 1.1. Note for instance, that of the 6604 prospects included in the 7-year sample of ex
ante forecasts, 201 (about 3%) were given Rivals’ top rating of 5-star, making this a very
select group.11 Of those top 201 prospective players, only 93 (46%) went on to be drafted,
9The NCAA’s current Division I manual can be downloaded at: ncaapublications.com.
10Rivals is a scouting agency that annually rates and ranks thousands of prospective college football players
based on talent. Data are retrieved from footballrecruiting.rivals.com/
11As a reference point 253 players are selected annually in the NFL draft. A complete description of the
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and only 125 (62%) of the 5-star players were selected into the ex post groups of middle or
top tier players (see Table 1.2). This ex ante uncertainty is quantitatively important. Thus,
the MRP estimates for ex post top tier players, exceed the ex ante expected MRP estimates
for 5-star prospects, by at least $251,393 and 76.56% of the expected MRP estimate.12
Table 1.1. Draft Outcomes by Rivals Ratings 2002-08
Rivals Rating # with Rating % with Rating* # Drafted % Drafted*
5-star 201 3.04% 93 46.27%
4-star 1839 27.84% 353 19.20%
3-star 4564 70.46% 402 8.81%
Total 6604 100% 848 12.84%
*% of 6604 player sample
Table 1.2. Ranked or Drafted by Rivals Ratings 2002-08
Rivals Rating # with Rating # Ranked/Drafted % Ranked/Drafted*
5-star 201 125 62.19%
4-star 1839 596 32.41%
3-star 4654 868 19.02%
Total 6604 1589 24.06%
*% of 6604 player sample
My results also challenge any notion that the average performer in FBS college foot-
ball generates revenue for his school that significantly exceeds his compensation. Over this
8-year period, ex post top tier players accounted for approximately the top 9% of scholarship
players participating at the 114 FBS institutions sampled. Middle tier players accounted for
roughly the top 9% to 18%, with bottom tier players accounting for the remaining 82%. The
NCAA reports that the average out-of-state tuition scholarship at a public university carries
a market value of approximately $25,000 per year. Figuring conservatively and taking that
figure as the annual value of the compensation package, this paper’s results do suggest that
over a four year collegiate career, NFL quality players generate revenue for their institutions
in excess of their compensation by an economically significant amount (consistent with the
Rivals rating scale and all other data are found in Section 1.2.
12These estimates are of a player’s MRP over a four year collegiate career.
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findings of Brown (1993), although my annual estimates are about $370,000 less). MRP es-
timates for ex post middle tier players are economically significant as well, but the difference
in MRP and the compensation’s market value is statistically insignificant.
Overall, my findings suggest that market-wide, NCAA member institutions do not
enjoy as great a degree of monopsony power as some contend. Moreover, the current compen-
sation may meet or even exceed the amount that a player of average ability would command
in a competitive labor market. These results have interesting implications as courts and
member institutions consider policy reforms. They are also notable as the potential players’
union at Northwestern pends, and players nationwide weigh the merits of unionization. It
appears that the current system might actually benefit a majority of FBS scholarship play-
ers, at the expense of a highly productive minority. Ironically, this result would also be
consistent with the presence of a strong labor union.
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1.1 The College Football Labor Market
Monopsony power in the college football labor market results primarily from NCAA
amateurism rules, which limit player compensation to a full-tuition scholarship and the
coverage of certain expenses.13 These rules effectively restrict wage competition among
schools.
Two different policies restrict labor mobility in the college football industry, although
only one restricts mobility ex ante. Per NFL rules, players are not eligible to play in the NFL
until 3 years after their senior year of high school. Thus collegiate football is effectively the
only option for high school graduates who seek employment in the US as football players. It
should be noted however that more than 1000 college football prospects receive scholarships
from FBS schools each year, whereas only 253 players are selected annually in the NFL draft.
Therefore, the NFL’s eligibility requirement realistically restricts labor mobility only for the
most promising college football prospects. The other policy limiting labor mobility is an
NCAA rule that requires players to sit out one football season if they wish to transfer to
another FBS program. Since this policy only applies to players ex post, it is not a source
of monopsony power in the primary college football labor market, where prospective players
are free to accept scholarship offers from any school they choose. Were the amateurism rules
lifted, these transfer restrictions would prevent secondary labor markets from materializing.
As mentioned, Brown (1993, 2011) find that the realized MRP of an ex post NFL
caliber player exceeds the market value of his compensation package significantly. Note
however, that FBS programs typically award full scholarships to 85 players annually, the
maximum allowed by NCAA rules.14 Thus, within a school, wages are identical for the ex
ante most and least promising players. Therefore, the rents implied by MRP estimates such
as Brown’s, overstate monopsony power in two regards. Due to the effectively uniform wage
within schools, rents will necessarily be higher on players of above average ex ante promise.
13Among these expenses are room and board, textbooks, and medical insurance.
14NCAA regulations limit FBS schools to 85 scholarship players under normal circumstances. That limit
is sometimes reduced for programs placed on probation.
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Moreover, as a consequence of uncertain labor quality, MRP estimates from the ex post
highest quality players overstate the expected MRP for even the ex ante most promising
players. This therefore overstates rent on the ex ante most promising players as well.
Finally, a note on the annual provision of football scholarships by FBS schools. FBS
institutions are not required to provide full scholarships to all 85 players, or even meet the
85 player limit, but they typically do.15 My results suggest that the ex ante expected MRP
for many FBS players is less than the cost of the scholarship. Thus, the annual provision of
85 full scholarships suggests that schools may not maximize expected profits from football.
It is important to remember that football programs operate within athletic departments,
which in turn operate within much larger universities as a whole. University presidents and
chancellors likely have objectives beyond simply maximizing expected profits from football
or even athletics. The fact that these same schools often fund scholarships for several men’s
sports known to operate at losses, would seem to support this notion. While decisions
regarding the allocation of football scholarships to certain players are made by head coaches
or members of their staff, coaches likely lack the authority to divert scholarship funds to
other purposes that might yield a greater return. Thus, the provision of a scholarship to a
football player does not necessarily imply that his expected MRP is greater than or equal to
the cost of the scholarship.
15Although a player receiving a partial scholarship would count against the 85 player limit.
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1.2 Data Description
The data used in this paper are collected at both the individual or player-level, as well
as the university or institution-level. In this section I give a detailed explanation of these
data, beginning with those collected at the player-level, and followed by those collected at
the institution-level.
1.2.1 Player-Level Data
I collect Rivals.com data for 6604 college football players who meet the following
criteria: they were rated 3-star or higher by Rivals, and they were recruited out of high
school between 2002-2008, to one of the 114 institutions sampled. Rivals ratings are first
available for the year 2002, and I collect them only up through 2008 to allow players sufficient
time to matriculate to the NFL. Rivals describes a five-star prospect as “one of the nation’s
top 25-30 players”, a four-star prospect as “a top 250-300 or so player”, and a three-star
prospect as “a top 750 player.” I also collect the player’s position as listed by Rivals, the
school that recruited him, and his recruitment year. These data are available online at:
footballrecruiting.rivals.com.
All FBS scholarship players are sorted into three ex post quality tiers. Recall that
players drafted in the NFL following their collegiate careers constitute the top tier; and
players ranked among the top 500 draft prospects by CBS Sports, but not drafted, make
up the middle tier. Players neither ranked top 500, nor drafted, constitute the bottom
tier. Historical NFL draft records are available from numerous sources, including online at:
nfl.com/draft/history/fulldraft. CBS Sports first published draft prospect rankings following
the 2004 college football season, for the 2005 NFL draft. Two things should be noted about
the data I collect from CBS Sports. First, in some years CBS sports ranked slightly more
than 500 players. For example, prior to the 2006 NFL Draft they ranked the top 540
prospects. For consistency I use their rankings up to the same cutoff point every year, which
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is the top 499.16 Thus, the middle tier actually consists of players ranked among the top 499
prospects, but not drafted. I call it the “top 500” for convenience of exposition. The other
note is that players are sorted into these tiers based only on their ranking in the year they
finished their collegiate careers. That is, juniors ranked among the top 500 prospects who
stay in college for their senior season instead of entering the draft, are not thereby counted
as middle tier players. They are instead sorted to one of the ex post tiers based on their
ranking or draft outcome following their senior season. The CBS Sports prospect rankings
are available online at: cbssports.com/nfl/draft/prospectrankings.
1.2.2 Institution-Level Data
Institution-level data are collected on 114 NCAA member schools whose football pro-
grams have participated in Division I-A/FBS since the 2004 college football season.17 Data
are collected annually from 2004-2011.
Annual football revenue figures come from the US Department of Education (US-
DOE). Beginning in 2003, the athletic departments of NCAA member institutions were
required to submit annual financial reports to the USDOE, in compliance with the Equity
in Athletics Disclosure Act of Congress. These reports are publicly available online at the
USDOE’s website: ope.ed.gov/athletics. The football revenue measure is fairly comprehen-
sive. The USDOE describes it as: “revenues from appearance guarantees and options, an
athletic conference, tournament or bowl games, concessions, contributions from alumni and
others, institutional support, program advertising and sales, radio and television, royalties,
signage and other sponsorships, sport camps, state or other government support, student ac-
tivity fees, ticket and luxury box sales, and any other revenues attributable to intercollegiate
athletic activities.” The revenue data I collect is attributable only to the “intercollegiate
athletic activity” of football. I report all revenue figures in 2005 USD, using the US GDP
16They only ranked 499 prospects in 2004, the smallest number in any year.
17There were 120 FBS programs by the 2011 college football season. The six additional programs joined
the FBS during the sample period, and are excluded from the sample for that reason.
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deflator. Note that revenue was not reported for the University of Maryland in years 2005-
2007, leaving three missing revenue observations, which are skipped in estimation.
A school’s annual winning percentage is the number of games won in a season, as a
percentage of the total number of games played. Such information is available from a wide
range of sources. I collect this information from the Stassen College Football Information
database, which is accessible online at: football.stassen.com.18
18The Stassen Database credits: jhowell.net/cf/scores/ScoresIndex.htm, as their initial source.
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1.3 Methodology
I estimate MRP by ex post player quality in two steps. I first estimate expected
winning percentage as function of ex post realized player quality, which yields estimates of
marginal product by ex post quality tier. I then estimate expected revenue as a function of
winning percentage, which yields estimates of the change in expected revenue given changes
in winning percentage. MRP estimates by ex post quality tier are imputed as products of the
two sets of estimates. This two step approach is consistent with Scully (1974) and Kraut-
mann (1999), who estimate MRP in professional baseball and football respectively. At the
player level, I then estimate the probability that a player will be selected into each of the ex
post quality tiers conditional on his ex ante Rivals rating. I combine the estimates of MRP
by ex post quality tier with these estimated conditional probabilities to impute expected
MRP by ex ante Rivals rating.
Finally, I test the sensitivity of these results to a narrower definition of the college
football labor market. I restrict my sample to players and institutions that participated
in Bowl Championship Series (BCS) “automatic qualifier” conferences. The BCS, an as-
sociation of the four most lucrative post-season bowl games, had agreements with these
conferences which guaranteed the conference champions an invitation to one of those four
(and eventually five) games.19 Over the 2004 to 2011 sample period, the BCS “automatic
qualifier” conferences were analogous to the current “power five” conferences. I then esti-
mate MRP by ex post player quality, and expected MRP by ex ante player promise, for this
subsample.
19The “automatic qualifier” schools were members of the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big East, the Big
Ten, the Big Twelve, the Pacific Ten, the Southeastern Conference, and the University of Notre Dame.
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1.3.1 Production Equation
I measure output in a given year through winning percentage.20 WPCTi,t denotes
winning percentage for school i in season t.21 TOPi,t denotes the count of players from
school i that were selected in the NFL Draft immediately following season t; that is, the
number of ex post top tier players at school i who finish their collegiate careers in season
t. MIDi,t denotes the count of players from school i, who were ranked among the top 500
prospects by CBS Sports in year t, entered the draft immediately following season t, but
were not drafted; that is, the number of ex post middle tier players at school i who finish
their collegiate careers in year t. The estimated production equation is,
WPCTi,t = ai + [TOPi,t,MIDi,t]α+ i,t. (1.1)
Here, TOPi,t denotes the vector [TOPi,t, TOPi,t+1, TOPi,t+2, TOPi,t+3], and MIDi,t denotes
the vector [MIDi,t,MIDi,t+1,MIDi,t+2,MIDi,t+3]. In any year, teams consist of players
who are at different stages in their college careers. I include one, two, and three year leads of
TOPi,t and MIDi,t. This accounts for the contribution of top and middle tier players on a
school’s year t football team, who would complete their careers in later years. For instance,
TOPi,t+1, which is the count of players at school i drafted following season t+1, is effectively
the number of top tier players at school i who were juniors in year t. I include institution
fixed effects to control for school specific characteristics such as quality of practice facilities
and coaching staffs, which correlate with both winning percentage and ex post player quality.
Note that while these features may not be entirely time invariant, they tend to vary at a
much slower frequency than winning percentage and the composite labor quality of the team.
20Measuring output quality in commercial sports through winning percentage is consistent with Scully
(1974); Atkinson et al. (1988); and Krautmann (1999).
21Index t denotes the calendar year in which the college football season began, and includes all bowl games
and the NFL Draft immediately following that season. For instance t = 2004 begins with the open of the
2004 college football season, and ends with NFL draft immediately following, which actually took place in
April 2005.
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1.3.2 Revenue Equation
Revenue from football for institution i in season t is denoted REVi,t. The estimated
revenue equation is,
REVi,t = bi + β1WPCTi,t + β2WPCTi,t−1 + z′i,tβ + υi,t. (1.2)
Again, WPCTi,t is the winning percentage for school i in the given season, and WPCTi,t−1 is
winning percentage for i in the previous year’s season. The components of revenue that likely
vary the most from year to year are ticket sales, bowl appearances, and alumni contributions.
All three directly correlate with the success of the team, which is accounted for by WPCTi,t.
Some ticket sales occur before the start of the season. Conceivably, most variation in pre-
season ticket sales for an institution, depends on expected performance of the team among
its fans. I include WPCTi,t−1 to account for pre-season expected performance. This is
consistent with Atkinson et al. (1988) who model variation in current revenue for an NFL
team, as a function of the number of wins the team had in the previous season.
The vector of control variables zi,t contains year dummies and the count of home
games school i played in year t, against opponents ranked in the Associated Press Top
25 poll, denoted HRi,t. This is included to control for any annual variation in a school’s
revenue that might be due to variation in the quality of the teams it hosts. I include school
fixed effects to control for characteristics that correlate with both winning percentage and
revenue. These would be features such as stadium size, regional substitutes for college
football, conference membership, and especially historic success of the program. All of these
features are essentially fixed, or vary at a substantially slower frequency than annual winning
percentage, and are likely absorbed in school intercept estimates.
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1.3.3 Selection Equation
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) allow estimation of realized MRP for ex post top and middle
tier players. A prospective player j, is recruited to institution i in year s, and finishes his
collegiate career in s+ h. Let the latent variable q∗j(i),s+h denote the ex post realized quality
of player j, recruited to school i in year s, and completing his career in year s + h. Let the
ordinal variable TIERj(i),s+h indicate the ex post quality tier of player j, recruited to school
i in year s and completing his career in year s+ h. It takes the values
TIERj(i),s+h =

2, if top tier
1, if middle tier
0, if bottom tier
 . (1.3)
The latent measure of ex post quality is modeled as the following function of information
available ex ante (in year s),
q∗j(i),s+h = γ1FV STj(i),s + γ2FRSTj(i),s + z
′
j(i),sγ + ci + ψj(i),s+h. (1.4)
Variation in q∗j(i),s+h, is observed through TIERj(i),s+h, and from equation (1.4), I estimate
the conditional probability of each TIER outcome, under both the logit and linear prob-
ability specifications. FV STj(i),s and FRSTj(i),s are dummy variables indicating whether
or not players were rated 5-star by Rivals or 4-star by Rivals, respectively. The vector of
control variables zj(i),s, contains dummy variables indicating the position that j played when
recruited, and the year in which he was recruited. The effect of the school attended on a
player’s ex post quality, ci, likely correlates with his Rivals rating. Prospective players self-
select into a school by choosing from their available scholarship offers. Players of greater ex
ante promise have more options, and are likely able to self-select into schools with higher
values of ci.
To account for this school specific effect, ci, I utilize two possible approaches. One
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approach is to assume a linear probability specification, include school fixed effects, and
estimate (1.4) twice; first with a dummy dependent variable indicating whether or not the
player was realized as ex post top or middle tier, and then with a dummy dependent vari-
able indicating whether or not he was realized as top tier. The linear probability model has
notable drawbacks, but does permit ci to be completely controlled for through linear fixed
effects estimation. A logit or probit specification implies a non-linear estimation equation,
meaning ci cannot be transformed away as in the linear model.
22 As an alternative, I es-
timate (1.4) under a logit specification, and partially control for ci using the approach of
Mundlak (1978). If a linear relationship exists between ci and the explanatory variables in
(1.4), then ci can be expressed as a linear function of school averages of the explanatory
variables in (1.4). That is, one can let the heterogeneous effect be
ci = θ0 +X
′
iθ + κi, (1.5)
where the vector X i = [FV ST i, FRST i, zi] contains averages of the explanatory variables
from all players recruited to school i over the full sample period. The reduced form selection
equation for the Mundlak estimation approach is then
q∗j(i),s+h = θ0 + γ1FV STj(i),s + γ2FRSTj(i),s + z
′
j(i),sγ +X
′
iθ + κi + ψj(i),s+h. (1.6)
A residual school specific effect, ei, remains. However, since variations in school means of the
explanatory variables are now removed from ci, ei is less likely to correlate with individual
rating and position than is ci. That is, the school means, X i, should project onto the
component of ci that is correlated with the explanatory variables, thereby controlling for any
school specific effects with which the explanatory variables would otherwise be correlated.
I estimate the conditional probabilities of each TIER outcome implied by (1.6), under an
22Moreover, estimates of ci are inconsistent due the incidental parameters problem. See Neyman and
Scott.
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ordered logit specification. Conditional probability estimates from both the linear probability
and ordered logit Mundlak approaches are reported in Section 1.4.4, and used in Section 1.4.5
to impute estimates of ex ante expected MRP.
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1.4 Results
In this section, I begin by using fixed effects estimates of equation (1.2) to establish
upper and lower bound estimates for the MP of a bottom tier player. These boundary
estimates then imply upper and lower bound estimates for the MP of a middle tier and top
tier player. I then use these MP estimates, along with estimates of fixed effects estimates
of Equation (1.2), to impute upper and lower bound estimates of MRP for players of each
ex post quality tier. These ex post MRP estimates are then adjusted using estimates of the
probability that a player is realized within each ex post quality tier, conditional on his ex ante
Rivals rating, football position, and school selection. The adjusted values are estimates of ex
ante expected MRP. Finally, these steps are repeated for the subsample of BCS automatic
qualifier schools (and players attending those schools).
1.4.1 Marginal Product Estimates
Production equation estimates are reported in Table 1.3. Column (1) reports random
effects estimates of equation (1), and column (2) reports the estimates including school fixed
effects. The reported “Average FE” estimate in column (2) is an average of the 114 different
school-specific intercept estimates. That is,
Average FE = aˆ =
1
114
114∑
i=1
aˆi. (1.7)
Standard errors, clustered by school, are given in parentheses. WPCT is measured in per-
centage points. Recall that TOP and MID are counts of ex post top and middle tier players,
respectively. Also remember that the leads of TOP and MID are included to account for
ex post top and middle tier players who are part of the team in year t, but complete their
collegiate careers in later seasons. For instance, TOPi,t+1 can be thought of as the count of
top tier juniors at school i in year t, and so on. The column (2) estimates suggest that top
tier players in their final three seasons, and middle tier players in their final two seasons, are
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significantly more productive than bottom tier players.
Table 1.3. Production Equation Estimates
(1) (2)
Variable WPCT WPCT
TOPt 3.064*** 3.419***
(0.363) (0.531)
TOPt+1 2.376*** 2.711***
(0.372) (0.495)
TOPt+2 1.177*** 1.534***
(0.371) (0.481)
TOPt+3 0.269 0.685
(0.365) (0.494)
MIDt 1.405*** 1.468**
(0.476) (0.595)
MIDt+1 1.343*** 1.452***
(0.436) (0.518)
MIDt+2 0.704 0.659
(0.455) (0.558)
MIDt+3 -0.955** -0.961*
(0.450) (0.579)
Intercept/Average FE 33.378*** 30.218***
(1.877) (3.503)
School FE N Y
N 570 570
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1
The fact that the contribution of ex post bottom tier players is not separately identi-
fied from the school intercepts presents a complication. The coefficient on TOPi,t for instance
does not estimate the MP of an ex post top tier senior, but rather the difference between the
MP of an ex post top tier senior and the MP of an ex post bottom tier player. To handle this
issue I infer upper and lower bound estimates for the MP of an ex post bottom tier player.
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From these boundary estimates of bottom tier MP, I am able to construct interval estimates
for the MP of ex post top and middle tier players.
Establishing upper and lower bounds for the MP of a bottom tier player reduces to
an interpretation of the school intercept average. Note that the school specific intercepts
may be interpreted as the conditional expectation
ai = E[WPCTi,t|(TOPi,t,MIDi,t) = 01×6]. (1.8)
That is, αˆi estimates expected winning percentage, if all 85 players at school i in year t were ex
post bottom tier. The average fixed effect of 30.218% reported in Table 1.3 is the industry-
wide average of said estimates. The question is what portion of that estimated 30.218%
is attributable to the 85 ex post bottom tier players, and what portion is attributable to
coaches, practice facilities, and other school capital?
The natural lower bound for the annual MP of ex post bottom tier players is zero.
This credits the 85 bottom tier players with none of the 30.218% expected WPCT . In this
extreme, the coefficients reported in column (2) of Table 1.3 can be interpreted as marginal
product estimates. Since the career MP for bottom tier players is taken to be zero, it follows
that the lower bound estimate of career MP for an ex post top tier player is
αˆ1 + αˆ2 + αˆ3 + αˆ4 = 8.348%. (1.9)
Analogously, the upper bound treatment is to credit the 30.218% WPCT entirely to the 85
bottom tier players. The upper bound estimate of annual MP for bottom tier player is then
αˆ
85
= 0.356%, (1.10)
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and the upper bound estimate for MP over a 4-year career is simply
4 ·
(
αˆ
85
)
= 1.422%. (1.11)
It follows then that the upper bound estimate of career MP of an ex post top tier player is
(
4 ·
(
αˆ
85
))
+ (αˆ1 + αˆ2 + αˆ3 + αˆ4) = 9.77%. (1.12)
The lower and upper bound estimates of career MP for a middle tier player are calculated
the same as in equations (1.9) and (1.12), but with the coefficients (αˆ5, αˆ6, αˆ7, αˆ8) replacing
(αˆ1, αˆ2, αˆ3, αˆ4).
Table 1.4 reports these boundary estimates of marginal product for ex post top,
middle, and bottom tier players, over four year careers. Standard errors for the boundary
estimates are reported in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals are reported in brack-
ets. Recall that the dependent variable being estimated in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, is WPCT
from a single season (approximately 12 games). As a reference point for interpreting these
coefficients, a single game is 8.333% of 12 game season. Thus, the career MP estimates for
an ex post top tier player can be loosely interpreted as one additional win.
An initial observation from Table 1.4 is that the ex post top, middle, and bottom
tiers appear to be appropriately defined. As expected, MP estimates increase from bottom
to middle tier, and middle to top tier. Comparison of the confidence intervals on both the
upper and lower bound point estimates, shows that a top tier player is significantly more
productive than a middle tier player. Moreover these differences do seem substantial. At the
upper bounds, ex post top and middle tier players are more productive than bottom play-
ers, by factors of approximately 7.25 and 2.9 respectively. At the upper and lower bound
estimates, ex post top tier players are more productive than middle tier players by factors
of roughly 2.47 and 3.23 respectively.
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Table 1.4. Marginal Product Estimates: Career Contributions
Ex post Quality Lower Bound Upper Bound
Top Tier 8.348*** 9.770***
(1.327) (1.226)
[5.720, 10.977] [7.342, 12.199]
Middle Tier 2.617* 4.039***
(1.447) (1.343)
[-0.250, 5.484] [1.379, 6.699]
Bottom Tier —— 1.422***
—— (0.165)
—— [ 1.095, 1.749]
[95% Confidence Interval]
1.4.2 Revenue Equation Estimates
Revenue equation estimates are reported in Table 1.5. Column (1) reports random
effects estimates of equation (1.2), and column (2) reports the estimates including school
fixed effects. The estimated marginal effects of current and lagged winning percentage are
economically significant in column (2). The reported two-year effect of winning percentage is
the sum of the coefficients on WPCTt and WPCTt−1. This sum suggests that an additional
win, or approximately 8.3% increase in WPCTt, generates an additional $490,408 in revenue
over two years.23
23All revenue figures are measured in 2005 USD.
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Table 1.5. Revenue Equation Estimates
(1) (2)
Variable REV REV
WPCTt 44,873.67*** 36,304.79***
(9,809.89) (10,987.41)
WPCTt−1 30,898.58*** 22,780.56**
(9383.06) (10,473.30)
2-year effect WPCT 75,772.25*** 59,085.35***
95% C.I. [39,676.15, 99,862.90] [35,209.52, 82,961.18]
(15,169.05) (17,191.07)
HR 166,951.90 -16,381.40
(120,121.80) (133,014.00)
Intercept/Average FE 12,465,219.70*** 13,531,982.1***
(1,451,299.90) (869,716.7)
Year FE Y Y
School FE N Y
N 795 795
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1
1.4.3 MRP Estimates by Ex Post Quality
MRP estimates for ex post top, middle, bottom tier players are reported in Table 1.6.
These values come from the fixed effects estimates of equations (1.1) and (1.2). Standard
error estimates, clustered by school, are reported in parentheses; and 95% confidence intervals
based on those standard errors are reported in brackets. These standard error estimates are
based on delta method approximate distributions for the MRP estimates, which are nonlinear
combinations of product and revenue equation estimates.
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Table 1.6. MRP Estimates by Ex Post Quality: Career Contributions
Ex post Quality Lower Bound Upper Bound
Top Tier $493,271.90*** $577,292.20***
($148,444.10) ($166,488.10)
[$202,326.80, $784,217.10] [$250,981.60, $903,602.90]
Middle Tier $154,635.90* $238,656.20***
($87,117.40) ($95,995.71)
[-$16,329.47, $326,917.80] [$50,508.05, $426,804.3]
Bottom Tier — $84,020.29***
— ($24,048.93)
— [$36,885.26, $131,155.30]
Weighted Average $74,285.82*** $143,157.20***
($21,138.63) ($38,316.10)
[$32,854.87, $115,716.80] [$68,059.07, $218,255.40]
N 912 912
[95% Confidence Interval]
Consider the lower bound marginal product parameter for an ex post top tier senior,
α1. An increase in expected WPCTi,t of α1 percentage points, increases expected REVi,t by
α1 · β1 dollars. Recall that β1 is the equation (1.2) parameter on WPCTi,t. The increase in
expected WPCTi,t also increases expected REVi,t+1 by α1 · β2 dollars. The same follows for
the other three seasons he plays. Thus, the lower bound estimate of MRP for an ex post top
tier player, over a 4-year career, is
(αˆ1 + αˆ2 + αˆ3 + αˆ4) · (βˆ1 + βˆ2). (1.13)
The upper bound MRP estimate for an ex post top tier player, over a 4-year career, is
[(
aˆ · 4
85
)
+ αˆ1 + αˆ2 + αˆ3 + αˆ4
]
· (βˆ1 + βˆ2). (1.14)
The upper and lower bound MRP estimates for ex post middle tier players are imputed in
the same way, but with the fixed effects coefficients on MIDi,t replacing the fixed effects
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coefficients on TOPi,t. The upper bound MRP estimate for ex post bottom tier players is
simply (
aˆ · 4
85
)
· (βˆ1 + βˆ2). (1.15)
Note that
(
aˆ · 1
85
)
was the upper bound estimate of the annual MP for a bottom tier player.
The implied four year upper bound MP estimate for a bottom tier player is then
(
aˆ · 4
85
)
.
In Table 1.6 we see that both the upper and lower bound estimates of the four-
year MRP for an ex post top tier player are economically significant. Note also that both
point estimates are significantly different from the approximate compensation measure of
$100,000. The upper bound MRP estimates for ex post middle and bottom tier players
are both economically significant. However, neither estimate is significantly different from
$100,000. This begins to call into question the notion that the average performer in FBS
football generates revenue in excess of his compensation.
Over the 2004-2011 sample period, there were a total of 1,788 ex post top tier players,
and 1,705 ex post middle tier players. Given the scholarship player limit of 85 per year,
and accounting for the instances when schools faced reduced limits, there were a total of
77,436 rosters spots in my sample.24 Assuming four year careers, and dividing that total
by 4, suggests there were approximately 19,380 different scholarship players, and a total of
15,866 ex post bottom tier players, at the 114 institutions from 2004-2011. Based on this
estimated ex post quality distribution, I compute the weighted average of the MRP’s and
report them toward the bottom of Table 1.6. Notice especially that even the upper bound
weighted average estimate is not significantly different from $100,000. These estimates fail
to reject the hypotheses that the average FBS performer generates revenue in excess of his
compensation.
24Information on scholarship limit reductions are from the NCAA’s Legislative Service Database. This
database records cases of major rules infractions and respective penalties, and is available online at
web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch.
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1.4.4 Selection Equation Estimates
Table 1.7 reports selection equation estimates under the linear probability model
specification. Column (3) reports estimates from the full model with the dummy dependent
variable, I(TIERj(i),s+h ≥ 1); which indicates whether or not player j was ex post top or
middle tier quality. Column (6) reports estimates from the full model with the dummy de-
pendent variable, I(TIERj(i),s+h = 2), which indicates whether or not player j was ex post
top tier quality. In both columns (3) and (6), the coefficients on FV ST and FRST are
statistically significant.
Table 1.8 reports selection equation estimates under the ordered logit specification.
Column (3) reports estimates of the full model, which includes school averages of the ex-
planatory variables as additional regressors. The coefficients on FV ST and FRST are
statistically significant. Under both specifications however, the parameters of interest are
the conditional probabilities of each ex post TIER outcome, which are reported in Tables
1.9, 11.10, and 1.11.
Table 1.9 reports estimated probabilities of being ex post top tier quality, conditional
on an ex ante Rivals rating. Table 1.10 reports estimated probabilities of being ex post top
or middle tier quality, given an ex ante Rivals rating. In both tables, linear probability
model estimates are reported in columns (1) and (2), and ordered logit model estimates are
reported in columns (3) and (4). Column (1) excludes school fixed effects, while column (2)
includes them. Column (3) excludes the Mundlak school averages, and column (4) includes
them. All columns in both tables include fixed effects for year recruited and position played.
Under both specifications, controlling for heterogeneous school effects somewhat decreases
the estimated probability of being ex post top or middle tier for 5-star and 4-star players,
but somewhat increases the estimated probability of being ex post top or middle tier for
3-star players. This suggests that players of greater ex ante promise, and therefore more
choices as to which school they attend, self-select into programs more capable of developing
their ex post quality. Probability estimates of all ex post outcomes, conditioned on ex ante
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rating, are reported in Table 11. In Tables 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11, note the similarity between
the conditional probability estimates under the linear probability specification with school
fixed effects, and ordered logit specification with the Mundlak (1978) school averages. Going
forward, I use the linear probability model estimates reported in the first three columns of
Table 1.11, since imputed values for ex ante expected MRP will be essentially the same
under both specifications.
Table 1.8. Selection Equation Estimates: Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Variable TIER TIER TIER
FV ST 2.045*** 2.063*** 1.701***
(0.161) (0.165) (0.172)
FRST 0.747*** 0.755*** 0.481***
(0.0680) (0.0674) (0.0610)
FV ST i — — -0.008
— — (2.697)
FRST i — — 1.870***
— — (0.485)
Top Tier Threshold† 0.804*** 0.805*** 0.815***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Year Recruited Y Y Y
Position N Y Y
Mundlak Averages N N Y
N 6604 6604 6604
†Middle Tier threshold set to 0, ***p < .01
29
Table 1.9. Estimated Probability of being Drafted
Rivals Rating (1) (2) (3) (4)
5-star 0.4637 0.4274 0.4468 0.4178
4-star 0.1916 0.1722 0.1793 0.1670
3-star 0.0882 0.0976 0.0931 0.0945
Linear Probability Y Y N N
Ordered Logit N N Y Y
School FE N Y N N
Mundlak Averages N N N Y
Table 1.10. Estimated Probability of being Ranked or Drafted
Rivals Rating (1) (2) (3) (4)
5-star 0.6220 0.5668 0.6437 0.6171
4-star 0.3251 0.2906 0.3282 0.3104
3-star 0.1898 0.2061 0.1868 0.1899
Linear Probability Y Y N N
Ordered Logit N N Y Y
School FE N Y N N
Mundlak Averages N N N Y
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1.4.5 Expected MRP Estimates
Estimates of ex ante expected MRP are reported in Tables 1.12 and 1.13. Table 1.12
reports estimates of ex ante expected MRP, rents on labor, and rent-to-MRP ratios. Rent
estimates assume a four-year compensation of $100,000. Table 1.13 compares the estimates
of realized MRP as a function of ex post quality with estimates of expected MRP as a
function of ex ante promise. These results emphasize the effect that uncertain labor quality
has on the ability of employers to exercise monopsony power, and thus, the importance
of accounting for potential quality uncertainty when empirically assessing monopsony in
labor markets. Looking at the upper bound estimates, MRP for an ex post top tier player
overstates expected MRP by $260,891 or 82.46% (of expected MRP) for an ex ante 5-star
prospect, and $388,328 or 205.5% (of expected MRP) for an ex ante 4-star prospect.
Table 1.12. Expected MRP and Rent Estimates by Ex Ante Rating: LPM with School FE
Expected MRP
Rivals Rating Lower Bound Upper Bound
5-star $232,380.65 $316,400.95
4-star $104,943.49 $188,963.78
3-star $64,921.33 $148,941.62
Rent on Labor†
Rivals Rating Lower Bound Upper Bound
5-star $132,380.65 $216,400.95
(Rent/MRP) (0.570 ) (0.684 )
4-star $4,943.49 $88,963.78
(Rent/MRP) (0.047 ) (0.471 )
3-star -$35,078.67 $48,941.62
(Rent/MRP) (-0.540 ) (0.329 )
†Assuming $100,000 career compensation
The ex post top tier player’s compensation falls short of the revenue he generates by
approximately 80% to 83% of his realized MRP. Yet, his school retains approximately 57%
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Table 1.13. Comparison: MRP by Ex Post Realized Quality and Ex Ante Promise
Ex post Quality Lower Bound Upper Bound
Top Tier $493,271.90 $577,292.20
Middle Tier $154,635.90 $238,656.20
Bottom Tier — $84,020.29
Weighted Average $74,285.82 $143,157.20
Rivals Rating
5-star $232,380.65 $316,400.95
4-star $104,943.49 $188,963.78
3-star $64,921.33 $148,941.62
to 69% of his expected MRP as a rent, if he is a 5-star prospect. The school retains anywhere
from 4% to 47% of his expected MRP, if he were a 4-star prospect. Finally, if rated 3-star
or lower ex ante, it is not clear that the school exercises any monopsony power over him at
all. If he were a 3-star prospect, his school might retain as much as 33% of his expected
MRP. Yet, at the other extreme, he may ultimately be compensated more than his ex ante
expected value.
These results are limited in two ways. First, they depend on an assumed wage. I have
assumed what I believe to be a conservative compensation value, in the interest of providing
strong inference to the conclusion that employer monopsony power in the college football
industry has been substantially overstated, not only in the degree exercised over players of
average quality, but even in the degree exercised over the highest quality players.25 The
other limitation is that the sample of Rivals rated players is a selected sample, drawing only
from players rated 3-star or higher. Consequently, the average player from this sample is of
greater ex ante promise than the average player from the population. However, this does not
conflict with the conclusion that employer mononopsony power in college football is limited.
25That is, I err on the side of possibly overstating rents.
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1.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, I test the robustness of the preceding estimates to two alternative
specifications. First, in light of the recent NCAA decision to allow players from “power five”
conference schools to receive a stipend, I estimate expected MRP for only those players who
attended a very similar set of schools to the present “power five” conference member. Then,
I consider a more general specification of the revenue equation in which REVi,t is dependent
on REVi,t−1.
1.5.1 A Narrower Definition of the Labor Market
As previously mentioned, this paper’s data come from a period in which the BCS had
agreements with six major conferences guaranteeing an invitation to one of the four or five
most lucrative post-season bowl games to the champion team of those conferences.26 There
were 62 BCS “automatic qualifier” (henceforth AQ) schools in 2004, and 65 thereafter.27
Over this period, AQ schools were analogous to the present-day “power-five” conference
schools. On average, the return on labor at an AQ school is likely higher than the return to
a non-AQ school. For this reason, I test the robustness of the preceding results to a narrower
definition of the labor market, in which AQ schools are the only employers.
Similar to Table 1.4, Table 1.14 reports lower and upper bound estimates for career
MP given ex post quality. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from the subsample of
AQ schools only, while columns (3) and (4) report estimates from the subsample of non-AQ
schools only. These values come from estimates of equation (1.1) with school fixed effects.
Table 1.15 reports lower and upper bound estimates of career MRP by ex post realized
quality. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates the subsample of AQ schools only, and columns
(3) and (4) report estimates from the subsample of non-AQ schools only. Similar to the MRP
26The University of Notre Dame was also included in this agreement. Although their football program is
independent, it was guaranteed an invitation it finished the regular season ranked among the top eight by
the BCS.
27The University of Cincinnati, the University of Louisville, and the University of South Florida accepted
invitations to join the Big East, beginning in 2005.
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estimates reported in Table 1.6, these values come from fixed effects estimates of equations
(1) and (2). Between AQ and non-AQ schools, there is considerable disparity in MRP across
all ex post quality levels, and this disparity is widest at the top tier. An ex post top tier player
at an AQ school, appears to generate anywhere from four to five times as much revenue as
a top tier player at a non-AQ school. The evidence that players generate significantly more
revenue at AQ schools than at non-AQ schools is not surprising. From the 95% confidence
interval, note that for AQ schools, the weighted average upper bound MRP estimate is
significantly greater than $100,000. Among non-AQ school, there is no evidence that player
compensation falls short of the MRP of an ex post top tier player, even at the upper bound.
Table 1.16 reports conditional probability estimates of all ex post outcomes for the
subsample of prospects recruited to AQ schools only. The conditional probability estimates
are not markedly different for this subsample. This is not surprising as 5,826 (or about 88%)
of the 6,604 prospect sample, were recruited to one of the AQ schools.
Similar to Table 1.12, Table 1.17 reports ex ante expected MRP estimates for the
subsample of prospects recruited AQ schools only. Rent estimates based on the assumed
$100,000 compensation are reported in the bottom portion of Table 1.17. For the purpose
of comparison, MRP estimates as a function of both ex post realized quality and ex ante
promise, for the subsample of AQ schools only, are reported in Table 1.18. Again, the effect
of uncertain labor quality is substantial. Looking at the upper bound estimates, MRP for an
ex post top tier player overstates expected MRP by $403,878 or 84.97% (of expected MRP)
for an ex ante 5-star prospect, and $597,029 or 211.6% (of expected MRP) for an ex ante
4-star prospect.
If analyses are restricted to AQ schools only, two results stand out. The first is that
better football performance generates a much greater return to AQ schools than non-AQ
schools. Thus, the potential “upside” on a prospective player is greater at AQ schools. From
Table 1.15 we see that over a four year career, an ex post top tier player may be worth
as much as $666,000 more to an AQ school than a non-AQ school. However, the issue of
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Table 1.17. Expected MRP and Rent Estimates if Attending AQ School: LPM with School
FE
Expected MRP
Rivals Rating Lower Bound Upper Bound
5-star $338,911.16 $475,296.06
4-star $145,760.65 $282,145.55
3-star $87,672.03 $224,056.93
Rent on Labor†
Rivals Rating Lower Bound Upper Bound
5-star $238,911.16 $375,296.06
(Rent/MRP) (0.705 ) (0.790 )
4-star $45,760.65 $182,145.55
(Rent/MRP) (0.314 ) (0.646 )
3-star -$12,327.97 $124,056.93
(Rent/MRP) (-0.141 ) (0.554 )
†Assuming $100,000 career compensation
ex ante uncertainty regarding labor quality is no different for this subsample. The ex ante
most promising players are still realized as ex post top tier less than half of the time. This
uncertainty inhibits the degree to which schools are able to exercise monopsony power in the
college football labor market.
1.5.2 Dynamic Revenue Function
As an alternative to the revenue equation specified by (1.2), suppose REVi,t depends
on past values of itself. Replacing lagged winning percentage with lagged revenue, consider
the dynamic revenue specification given by
REVi,t = bi + ρREVi,t−1 + β1WPCTi,t + z
′
i,tβ + vi,t. (1.16)
Note that equation (1.2) restricts ρ = 0.
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Table 1.18. Comparison: MRP by Ex Post Realized Quality and Ex Ante Promise at AQ
Schools
Ex post Quality Lower Bound Upper Bound
Top Tier $742,789.70 $879,174.60
Middle Tier $154,635.90 $238,656.20
Bottom Tier — $136,384.90
Weighted Average $116,135.60 $252,520.50
Rivals Rating
5-star $338,911.16 $475,296.06
4-star $145,760.65 $282,145.55
3-star $87,672.03 $224,056.93
First differencing (1.16) removes the school-specific term bi and gives
∆REVi,t = ρ∆REVi,t−1 + β1∆WPCTi,t + ∆z
′
i,tβ + ∆vi,t. (1.17)
I treat all explanatory variables as potentially endogenous, and estimate equation (1.17),
following Arellano and Bond (1991). This approach estimates equation (1.17) for t ≥ 3
only. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that if E(vi,tvi,t+h) = 0 for all h ≥ 2, then level
values of the dependent variable from 2 or more time periods prior are valid instruments
the differenced equation (1.17). These estimates are reported in Table 1.19. The reported
two-year effect of winning percentage on revenue is the estimate of β1 ·(1+ρ). The estimated
two-year effect is larger than that reported in column (2) of Table 1.2. Note however that the
95% confidence interval on two-year effect reported in Table 1.19 contains the corresponding
confidence interval from column (2) of Table 1.2. Thus, estimates of this two year effect are
not significantly different these two alternative specifications. The reported long-run effect
is the estimate of β1
(1−ρ) . This estimate is not significantly different from zero at the 95%
significance level.
40
Table 1.19. Revenue Equation: Arellano-Bond Two-Step Estimates
Variable REV
REVt−1 0.670***
(.100)
WPCTt 55,612.32**
(25,383.16)
Two year effect WPCTt 92,872.71**
(42,232.39)
95% C.I. [10,098.76, 175,646.70]
Long run effect WPCTt 168,523.40*
(88,329.49)
[-4,599.206, 341,646]
HRt 408,548.10
(424,920.1)
Year 3 778,208.80
(547,550.20)
Year 4 1,651,051***
(424,966.30)
Year 5 1,107,829**
(485,293.40)
Year 6 1,444,776**
(590,289.50)
Year 7 1,592,330***
(563,515.40)
Year 8 2,391,274***
(712,506)
N 680
Sargan Stat. 59.64384
Critical Value (p = .05) 76.778
(d.f.) (58)
Rejects H0 N
41
The estimates reported in Table 1.19 restrict the matrix of available instruments
to lagged values of revenue only, since all explanatory variables are treated as potentially
endogenous. A matrix of 67 instruments is utilized in the estimation of (1.17). Since the
number of instruments is greater than the number of endogenous explanatory variables, the
model is over-identified by the 67 assumptions that each instrument is uncorrelated with ∆vi,t
in the appropriate time periods. The lower panel of Table 1.19 reports test statistics for the
Sargan (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis of the test, the
matrix of available instruments is exogenous and the test statistic is distributed chi-square
with 58 degrees of freedom.28 The test statistic reported in Table 1.19 fails to reject the null
hypothesis. Rejection of the null would suggest that at least some of the 67 instruments are
endogenous, and call all estimates in Table 1.19 into question. A limitation of the Sargan
test is that the test statistic can only fail to reject that the instruments are exogenous. This
should not be seen as rejecting the hypothesis that an instrument is endogenous.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test for autocorrelation of the first-differenced
error term. Note that ∆vi,t will always be autocorrelated of order one, since ∆vi,t and
∆vi,t−1 both contain the level error vi,t−1. However, the absence of autocorrelation of order
two or higher will be consistent with the assumption that E(vi,tvi,t+h) = 0 for all h ≥ 2.
Thus, autocorrelation in ∆vi,t of order two or more calls the specification and estimates into
question. Test statistics for zero autocorrelation of orders one, two, three, four, and five, are
reported in Table 1.20. Under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, the test statistics
are distributed standard normal.29 As it should, the test rejects the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation of order one. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation
of order two or higher. Thus, these test statistics do not call the specification into question.
However, this does not reject the hypothesis of no higher order autocorrelation in ∆vi,t.
28The degrees of freedom are given by the number of identifying assumptions (67) minus the number of
explanatory variables (9).
29A detailed explanation of the calculation of these test statistics and a proof of asymptotic normality can
be found in Section 3 and the Appendix of Arellano and Bond (1991), respectively.
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Table 1.20. Arellano-Bond Test of No Autocorrelation in ∆vi,t
Order Test statistic p-value Rejects H0
1 -4.3343 ≈0 Y
2 -0.0979 0.9220 N
3 0.3234 0.7464 N
4 -0.3491 0.7270 N
5 0.4484 0.6539 N
Given the failure to reject the revenue function specification given in 1.16, it is worth
comparing the ex ante expected MRP implied by the estimates reported in Table 1.19 with
the initial estimates reported in Table 1.12. These alternative estimates of ex ante expected
MRP based on the long-run effect of WPCT are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table
1.21. Recall from Table 1.19 that the long-run effect is not significantly different from zero.
Thus, values reported in columns (1) and (2) should be viewed with some skepticism. The
alternative estimates of ex ante expected MRP based on the two-year effect of WPCT are
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.21. The initial estimates are reported in the
columns (3) and (4) for comparison.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
My results suggest that the degree of monopsony power held by member institutions
is more limited than Brown (1993, 2011) suggests. The ex post highest quality players do
generate revenue that is well in excess of their compensation’s market value. However, the
employers’ ability to exercise monopsony power over these elite performers is weakened by ex
ante uncertain labor quality. Moreover, the current compensation may meet or even exceed
the amount that a player of average ex ante promise would command in a competitive labor
market. As courts and NCAA member institutions consider policy changes, and as some
players propose them; these results have interesting implications. Among them, elite players
would likely benefit from more comprehensive reforms, such as permitting competitive wage
offers throughout the labor market. Yet, the below average performer could be made worse
off by such reforms, and see at least the market value of his compensation decrease. It would
seem that more modest policy changes, such as maintaining or slightly increasing the uniform
wage; are more favorable to the average and below average players, than a competitive labor
market alternative.
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMAL IRONING MADE EASY
In this chapter, I explore an implementability problem that arises in the construction
of optimal nonlinear price schedules. I show that the one-dimensional screening problem of
a monopolist practicing second-degree price discrimination, can be treated like a dynamic
programming problem and solved by backward induction using Bellman’s equation.1 This
approach builds on a multi-market treatment of nonlinear pricing problems developed in
Goldman et al. (1984), and Wilson (1993).
The standard model of second-degree price discrimination involves a monopolist sell-
ing different amounts of a singe good to many consumers who are privately informed of their
heterogeneous preferences for the good. Consumer preferences are ordered by a single pa-
rameter, their “type”. The higher a consumer’s type, the more she is willing to pay for any
positive amount of the good. The monopolist sets a schedule, assigning prices to bundles
of different amounts of the good. By offering quantity discounts, the monopolist’s optimal
price schedule serves as a screening mechanism, inducing higher types to buy larger bundles
than lower types.
Implicit in a monopolist’s price schedule are marginal prices for each unit of the good.
For example, if the monopolist prices a 1-unit bundle at $3 and a 2-unit bundle at $5, this
is equivalent to pricing the 1st unit at $3 and the 2nd at $2. The multi-market approach to
the problem treats each unit that a consumer buys as though it is a different good, sold in a
different market. The price of each of these “goods” is the marginal price for that unit. This
approach to the search for an optimal price schedule is advantageous, as it allows a complex
1Dynamic programming and the Bellman equation were developed in a series of works by Richard Bellman,
notably Bellman (1956) and Bellman (1957). Since then their application in economics has been widespread.
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problem to be broken up into simpler subproblems of great familiarity in economics. Rather
than searching for an optimal nonlinear price schedule in a single market, the monopolist
is seen a searching for optimal uniform prices in many independent markets. However, an
issue arises: these different markets are not in fact independent. A consumer’s demand for
the ith unit depends on her having consumed all units up to that point. The subproblems
overlap, and in some instances, the monopolist’s optimal price schedule cannot be completely
constructed from the optimal uniform prices treating each market in isolation. It is this issue
that motivates the dynamic programming treatment developed here.
The monopolist’s problem is shown to be one of choosing the set of customers he
sells to in each market. The optimal marginal price which induces that set of consumers to
buy, is implied. The minimum consumer type sold to in the market for a given unit will be
referred to as the marginal consumer type, or “marginal type”, of that market. Recall that
the consumer type is just a parameter ordering consumer preference or willingness-to-pay
for any given amount of the good. It follows that in a given market, the marginal type buys,
as do all consumers of higher types. Thus, the monopolist’s problem is modeled as one of
choosing a schedule of marginal types to maximize his profits across all markets. Goldman
et al. (1984) show that the monopolist is constrained in the following way: he must choose a
marginal type schedule that is monotonically non-decreasing in the quantity being sold. For
the monopolist to sell the ith unit to a consumer type, he must induce her to buy all units
leading up to the ith unit. This is not achieved in any region where a marginal type schedule
is decreasing in the quantity being sold.
One approach to the solution is to solve the monopolist’s “relaxed problem” (that is,
solve the problem ignoring the monotonicity constraint), and hope that the solution satisfies
the monotonicity constraint. In the event that the relaxed solution violates the constraint
it must be “ironed”. That is to say, the relaxed solution must be modified so as to make it
monotonically decreasing in quantity. This is typically done by way of an ironing procedure.
This procedure involves choosing a monotonic modification of the relaxed solution from the
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set of all possible monotonic modifications, that maximizes the monopolist’s profit over the
region of quantities where the schedule is modified. In instances where the relaxed solution
violates the monotonicity constraint, this ad hoc approach arrives at the monopolist’s solu-
tion in a manner that is indirect and somewhat unintuitive.
Alternatively, I show that the monopolist’s problem can be solved by backward in-
duction. When searching for the monopolist’s optimal marginal type schedule, the relaxed
solution is sometimes insufficient because the monopolist is not actually selling in indepen-
dent markets. The markets are interdependent in the following way: the set of consumers
that can be sold to the market for a given unit is determined by the set sold to in the market
for the previous unit, and the set sold to in the market for a given unit determines the set
that can be sold to in the market for the following unit. The structure of this dependence is
highly conducive to a dynamic programming solution. By incorporating Bellman equations,
the problem can be in a way that reflects the interdependence of the markets. The backward
induction solution method constructs the monopolist’s optimal schedule over a sequence of
stages. As needed, it irons the candidate schedule along the way to maintain monotonicity.
Ultimately, it identifies the monopolist’s optimal marginal price schedule even in instances
where the solution to the relaxed problem violates the monotonicity constraint. Most impor-
tantly, this approach exhibits why ironed mechanisms like the monopolist’s marginal type
schedule might be optimal, and it highlights the economic intuition behind the construction
of an optimally ironed schedule.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1, I provide two very simple examples of
the sort of problem being addressed. These examples highlight the relevance of the mono-
tonicity constraint. They are also used to contrast the ad hoc approach to ironing (and the
problem in general), with the systematic approach developed here. Section 2.2 presents a
formal version of the problem, in which the monopolist sells discrete amounts of the good to
a continuum of heterogeneous consumer types. Section 2.3 presents the solution by backward
induction. Finally Section 2.4 presents some early results and shows that ironed schedules
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solved by this method satisfy a summation condition. This condition is analogous to an
integral condition used to identify the optimal range of units over which to iron the schedule
in the ad hoc approach. This summation condition establishes that the backward induction
approach solves for the monopolist’s optimal schedule, even when the solution to the relaxed
problem violates the monotonicity constraint.
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2.1 Two Simple Examples
Consider first a monopolist selling discrete quantities q of a single good, to two con-
sumers. For simplicity assume he produces these units at zero marginal cost. The consumers’
heterogeneous preferences for the good are private information and ordered by the type pa-
rameter θ ∈ {θL, θH}, where θL < θH . The monopolist knows that one of the consumers
is type θL and the other is type θH , but does not know which is which. Let u(θ, q) be the
dollar value of the utility that type θ gets from consuming a bundle of q units. The marginal
utility of the ith unit to type θ, is u(θ, i)− u(θ, i− 1), denoted uq(θ, i) by abuse of notation.
2.1.1 Example I
Suppose the two types have the utility and marginal utility schedules given in Table
1, and that this is known to the monopolist. The monopolist will set a profit maximizing
price schedule which will serve as a screening mechanism by offering quantity discounts. This
is just a standard second degree price discrimination problem.
Table 2.1. Utility and Marginal Utility Schedules by Type: Example I
i u(θL, i) u(θH , i) uq(θ
L, i) uq(θ
H , i)
1 $4 $7 $4 $7
2 $5 $10 $1 $3
3 $5 $11 $0 $1
4 $5 $11 $0 $0
Let P (q) be the price for a bundle of q units. The marginal price of the ith unit is
P (i) − P (i − 1), and is denoted pi. In this first example the monopolist will sell at most
three units because neither type is willing to pay for more than a third unit. The monopolist
wishes to set the price schedule (P (1), P (2), P (3)) that will maximize profit from sale of
the good. Note that any price schedule like this, can be represented by a corresponding
schedule of marginal prices (p1, p2, p3) = (P (1), P (2) − P (1), P (3) − P (2)). Thus, one way
to think about the monopolist’s problem is to treat each successive unit as a separate good
with its own market, where the monopolist will simply set an optimal uniform price in each
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of the markets, which in this case will be the marginal price. This multi-market treatment
of nonlinear pricing problems is developed in Goldman et al. (1984) and Wilson (1993). To
facilitate this approach, let the ith market profit be the monopolist’s profit from the sale of
the ith unit only, as a function of the marginal price for the ith unit, denoted pii(pi).
In this first example the monopolist’s optimal price schedule will be (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3), where
p∗i is the argument chosen to maximize pii(pi). Recalling the marginal utility schedules in
Table 2.1, the solution in this example easy. Note that since the monopolist knows each type’s
marginal utility value for each unit, only those marginal utility values need be considered as
marginal prices. If the monopolist sets a marginal price for the 1st unit of $4, both consumers
will buy the 1st unit yielding a 1st market profit of $8. At a marginal price of $7, only the
consumer with type θH will buy the 1st unit yielding a 1st market profit of $7. So the optimal
1st market price is p∗1 = $4. At a marginal price of $1 for the 2
nd unit, he will sell to both
consumers for 2nd market profit of $2. At a marginal price of $3 he will sell only to type θH
for a 2nd market profit of $3. Thus, the optimal 2nd market price is p∗2 = $3. The optimal
3rd market marginal price is p∗3 = $1 by the same logic.
Table 2.2. Solving for the Optimal Price Schedule: Example I
q uq(θ
L, i) uq(i, θ
H , i) pii(uq(θ
L, i)) pii(uq(θ
H , i)) p∗i piq(p
∗
i )
1 $4 $7 $8 $7 $4 $8
2 $1 $3 $2 $3 $3 $3
3 $0 $1 $0 $1 $1 $1
Total $12
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A schedule of optimal prices for each market has been identified. A monotonicity
constraint must be met. The monopolists must set a price schedule such that the lowest
consumer type that is willing to buy in each market, is monotonically non-decreasing in q.
This is because a consumer will consider buying the 2nd only if the monopolist induces her to
buy the 1st unit. This first example was crafted in such a way that the monopolist’s optimal
price schedule could be identified without consideration of the latter monotonicity constraint.
In the second example, I use small changes to the problem show how this constraint can easily
be violated by the ad hoc search for an optimal price schedule just employed.
2.1.2 Example II
Consider a similar problem with the utility schedules are amended as in Table 2.3.
Table 2.4 reports the optimal price schedule solved using the same method as in the first
example.
Table 2.3. Utility and Marginal Utility Schedules by Type: Example II
i u(θL, i) u(θH , i) uq(θ
L, i) uq(θ
H , i)
1 $4 $9 $4 $9
2 $7 $13 $3 $4
3 $8 $15.50 $1 $2.50
4 $8 $15.50 $0 $0
Table 2.4. Solving for the Optimal Price Schedule: Example II
i uq(θ
L, i) uq(θ
H , i) pii(uq(θ
L, i)) pii(uq(θ
H , i)) p∗i piq(p
∗
i )
1 $4 $9 $8 $9 $9 $9
2 $3 $4 $6 $4 $3 $6
3 $1 $2.50 $2 $2.50 $2.50 $2.50
Total $17.50
The same approach as employed in the first example implies the optimal price schedule
($9, $3, $2.50) here. However it should be clear that the resulting allocation is not realistic.
The monopolist intends that both consumers buy in the 2nd market, when in fact, they
won’t. At this price schedule, θL prefers her outside option to any bundle offered, and buys
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none of the good. Type θH buys 3 units, and the monopolist’s total profit is in fact only
$14.50, as opposed to $17.50. This result is clearly suboptimal. One need only note that the
monopolist could extract a profit of $15.50 from the same allocation, by raising p2 from $3
to $4. This suboptimal outcome results because lowest consumer type that the monopolist
intends will buy in each market is not monotonically non-decreasing in q. The monopolist’s
intended outcome, in which a total profit of $17.50 is generated, is not feasible.
This example serves to highlight the importance of the monotonicity constraint.
Therefore, treating the minimum type sold to in each market as the monopolist’s choice
variable will make it easier to keep track of the monotonicity constraint.
2.1.2.1 The Marginal Consumer Type
For any implementable allocation of quantities to types, the monopolist’s optimal
price schedule with which to implement the allocation is immediate. Thus, an alternative
way to approach this profit maximization problem is to focus, not the price schedule chosen by
the monopolist, but instead on the resulting allocation. Specifically, suppose the monopolist
chooses the lowest consumer type to whom he will sell each unit. The optimal marginal price
in the market for each unit, is just the marginal utility of the lowest type sold to in the market
for that unit. The marginal type in the ith market will be the lowest type the monopolist
induces to buy the ith unit, denoted θi. Rather than considering a schedule of prices, the
monopolist’s decision problem can be represented as choosing a schedule of marginal types.
For any schedule of marginal types, an optimal schedule of marginal prices is implied, as
pi(θi) = uq(θi, i). The relevant monotonicity restriction is that this schedule of marginal
types must be monotonically non-decreasing in q. The monopolist can’t induce a consumer
to buy a 2nd unit unless he makes her willing to buy the 1st. Thus, the monopolist’s cannot
possibly implement a marginal type schedule that is non-monotonic in q.
It turns out that the schedule of marginal types, corresponding to the optimal price
schedule identified in Table 2, is (θL, θH , θH). Since θL < θH = θH , this schedule satisfies the
monotonicity constraint that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3, so this is the monopolist’s optimal marginal type
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schedule in the first example. The schedule of marginal types corresponding to the optimal
price schedule identified in Table 4, is (θH , θL, θH). This clearly violates the monotonicity
constraint and must be “ironed”; that is, it must be modified in some way to be made
monotonic. This schedule can be made monotonic in two possible ways. The marginal type
for the second unit, θ2, can pulled up to make the schedule (θ
H , θH , θH); or the marginal type
for the first unit θ1 can be pushed down, making the schedule (θ
L, θL, θH). Recalling that
the optimal pi(θi) = uq(i, θi); the marginal type schedule (θ
H , θH , θH) will mean a 1st market
profit of $9, a 2nd market profit of $4, and a 3rd market profit of $2.50, for a total profit of
$15.50. Alternatively, The marginal type schedule (θL, θL, θH) will mean a 1st market profit
of $8, a 2nd market profit of $6, and a 3rd market profit of $2.50, for a total profit of $16.50.
Thus, the optimal schedule of marginal types that can actually be implemented through a
price schedule is (θL, θL, θH).
This is a simplified version what I will call an ad hoc approach to ironing. In a
setting where the preference parameter θ is continuous, this approach amounts to finding
the schedule of marginal types that satisfy the first order conditions for maxima in the
different markets, ignoring the monopolist’s constraint. This schedule is then checked to
see if it satisfies the monotonicity constraint. If it does, the problem is solved. If not, the
schedule must be ironed to be implementable. The ironed version of the schedule which
maximizes the monopolist’s profit across all markets, is his optimal implementable schedule.
2.1.3 An Alternative Approach
In these two examples, the monopolist’s search for an optimal implementable screen-
ing mechanism, can be modeled using Bellman equations and solved by backward induction.
Like the multi-market approach already adopted, this dynamic programming treatment is a
useful tool for solving and better understanding the problem. The multi-market approach
treats the monopolist as though he is selling different goods, in independent markets. The
appeal of this approach is that it breaks up the monopolist’s problem into several simple
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subproblems. The only issue is that the subproblems are overlapping. By incorporating
Bellman equations, the problem can be modeled more realistically, as a monopolist selling
different goods in markets that are interdependent. The structure of this dependence is that
the demand for the ith unit depends on the marginal type in the market for (i − 1)th unit.
In the above examples it is apparent in the 3rd market that the set of marginal types from
which the monopolist can chose (or the “‘state” of the 3rd market), is determined by the
marginal type implemented in the 2nd market; and the set of marginal types from which
he chooses in the 2nd market, is determined by the marginal type implemented in the 1st
market.
Reconsider the second example. Given the monotonicity constraint that θ3 ≥ θ2, the
set from which the monopolist can choose θ3, depends on the marginal type chosen in the 2
nd
market, θ2. However, since the monopolist sells no units beyond the 3
rd, the 3rd market is
his terminal market. This means that only pi3 depends on θ3. Therefore, his optimal choice
of θ3 conditional on θ2 can be solved easily. Given any θ2, his optimal choice of θ3 is θ
H ,
yielding a market profit of $2.50. This is because θ3 = θ
H , satisfies monotonicity given either
choice of θ2. Let the maximum possible pi3 given any θ2 be represented by the value function
V3(θ2). Thus,
V3(θ2) = $2.50,∀θ2 ∈ {θL, θH}. (2.1)
In addition to V3, the choice of θ2 also determines his 2
nd market profit, pi2. Assuming
an optimal choice of θ3 in the resulting state of the 3
rd market, the monopolist’s total profit
as a function of θ2 is given by the Bellman equation,
pi2(θ2) + V3(θ2) =
 $4 + $2.50 = $6.50, θ2 = θ
H
$6 + $2.50 = $8.50, θ2 = θ
L
 . (2.2)
From equation (2.2), the monopolist’s optimal choice in the 2nd market given θ1, can
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be solved. If θ1 = θ
L, so θL is the state of the 2nd market, the optimal choice of θ2 is θ
L
(with the implication that θ3 = θ
H), yielding a profit of $8.50 from the 2nd and 3rd markets.
If θ1 = θ
H , his only implementable choice for θ2 will be θ
H , yielding a profit of $6.50 from
the 2nd and 3rd markets. The maximum possible pi2 + pi3 conditional on the choice of the θ1
is represented by the value function,
V2(θ1) =
 $6.50, θ1 = θ
H
$8.50, θ1 = θ
L
 . (2.3)
Finally, his choice of θ1 determines pi1 in addition to V2. Assuming that θ2 and θ3 are
chosen optimally in the resulting states of the 2nd and 3rd markets, the monopolist’s total
profit over all units as a function of θ1 can be expressed by the Bellman equation.
pi1(θ1) + V2(θ1) =
 $9 + $6.50 = $15.50, θ1 = θ
H
$8 + $8.50 = $16.50, θ1 = θ
L
 . (2.4)
It follows from (2.4) that the monopolist’s optimal choice of θ1, denoted θ
∗
1, is θ
L.
The optimal θ2 and θ1 implied by θ
∗
1, are (θ
∗
2, θ
∗
3) = (θ
L, θH). Altogether, the monopolist’s
optimal schedule is (θL, θL, θH). This is of course the same schedule identified in Section
2.1.2, when (θH , θL, θH) was “ironed”. However, the ad hoc search for the optimal schedule
from Section 2.1.2 arrives at the solution indirectly, and irons only after a complete schedule
for the monopolist has been proposed.
In the following section, this problem is generalized to consider not just two consumer
types, but a continuum of types θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The backward induction approach, with the use
of Bellman’s equation, exhibits why an ironed marginal type schedule might be optimal.
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2.2 The Monopolist’s Problem
Consider a monopolist selling successive discrete quantities q of a single good, to a
continuum of consumer types θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Consumer utility depends on quantity of the good
consumed and the consumer’s type, u = u(q, θ). The marginal utility of the ith unit for type
θ, is u(θ, i)−u(θ, i−1), denoted uq(θ, i), by abuse of notation. Assume diminishing marginal
utility (A1), and a single crossing condition (A2).
Assumption (A1). uq(θ, i) ≥ uq(θ, j)∀i < j.
Assumption (A2). uq(θ
A, i) < uq(θ
B, i),∀θA < θB ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, ..., N .
The distribution of θ is f(θ) = F ′(θ), where F (θ) is the CDF, so
F (θ) =
θ∫
θ
f(t)dt, (2.5)
and F (θ) = 1. The price a consumer pays for a bundle of i units is P (i). The monopolist
sets a price schedule (P (1), P (2), ..., P (N)), and the marginal price of the ith unit, denoted
by pi, is,
pi = P (i)− P (i− 1). (2.6)
The practice of second-degree price discrimination can be thought of in two different
ways. The monopolist can be treated as searching for a price schedule (P (1), P (2), ..., P (N)),
for a single good in a single market. However this price schedule will also imply N marginal
prices. By treating each successive unit i, as a separate good with its own market, the
monopolist can be seen as searching for N uniform prices (p1, p2, ..., pN), in N independent
markets. I adopt the latter. This multi-market treatment developed in Goldman et al.
(1984), and Wilson (1993), has the advantage of breaking the monopolist’s problem into
several simpler subproblems of great familiarity in economics.
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2.2.1 The Marginal Consumer Type
A concept central to the multi-market approach is that of the marginal consumer
type. In the market for the ith unit, there will be a minimum consumer type that is willing
to buy, given pi. Let this marginal type for the i
th unit be denoted θi, where,
θi = min{θ ∈ [θ, θ] : uq(i, θ) ≥ pi}. (2.7)
In the ith market, it will be optimal for the monopolist to extract all surplus from the marginal
type θi. Therefore the relationship between a marginal type θi and the corresponding optimal
pi which implements it, is one-to-one; and any search for the optimal price schedule with
which to implement a marginal type schedule, is trivial: the optimal marginal price as a
function of marginal type is
pi(θi) = uq(θi, i). (2.8)
Therefore, the monopolist’s problem can focus solely on the choice of a marginal type sched-
ule.
Assume the monopolist faces a constant marginal cost function in production of the
good, so c(q) = cq. Given the single crossing condition (A2), and the implicit marginal price
in (2.8), for a given marginal type θi, all θ ∈ [θi, θ] are willing to buy in the ith market. The
monopolist’s profit in the ith market as function of θi is then,
pii(θi) = [uq(θi, i)− c] · [1− F (θi)]. (2.9)
The monopolist sells up the N th unit, which is simply the last successive unit for which there
exists some θi ∈ [θ, θ] such that pii(θi) is non-negative. The monopolist chooses a schedule
of marginal types (θ1, θ2, ..., θN) to maximize the sum of profits across all markets. The
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monopolist’s objective function is then,
Π =
N∑
i=1
pii(θi). (2.10)
The monopolist’s problem, however, involves an important restriction regarding the set of
marginal type schedules that can be implemented by way of a price schedule.
2.2.2 Monotonicity Constraint
Although the nonlinear pricing problem is being treated as a multi-market monopolist
problem, it must be noted that the N markets are not independent. Only those consumers
induced to buy the 1st will consider buying the 2nd unit, and so on. Thus, the set of
consumers that the monopolist can sell to in the ith market, is determined by the marginal
type he chooses in the (i− 1)th market. The monopolist must choose a schedule of marginal
types that is monotonic in q. In other words, the monopolist must choose from the feasible
set,
{(θ1, θ2, ..., θN) : θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θN}. (2.11)
For a consumer type to be the marginal type in the ith market, she must be made willing
buy up to the (i− 1)th unit. That is, a marginal type θi < θi−1 is not feasible.
2.2.3 The Monopolist’s Objective
The monopolist’s objective is to choose the implementable schedule of marginal types
that will maximize his profit over all N markets,
max
θ1≤···≤θN
N∑
i=1
pii(θi). (2.12)
Finally, to ensure a global solution assume that pii(θi) is concave in θi for all markets,
Assumption (A3).
Assumption (A3). pii(θi) is concave in θi on [θ, θ],∀i = 1, ..., N .
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2.3 The Monopolist’s Solution
The monopolist’s subproblems of maximizing profit in each market, overlap in the
context of his broader problem which is the maximization of his profit across all markets.
The monotonicity constraint reflects that. He can choose θ1 from the interval [θ, θ]. However,
subject to the monotonicity constraint, θ2 must then be chosen from [θ1, θ], and so on. The
choice of marginal type in a given market therefore, not only determines the profit in that
market, but also the state of the proceeding market, since θi is the implementable lower
bound for θi+1.
The monopolist does have a terminal market. Since he only sells up to the N th unit,
the marginal type θN is not a state variable. That is, it does not determine the state of
the monopolist’s next market, because there no (N + 1)th market. This means that the
monopolist’s problem can be solved by backward induction, beginning with a solution for
the optimal choice of θN in any state of the N
th market.
2.3.1 Solution Stage N
The solution begins with what will be called Stage N . The monopolist is ultimately
searching for a schedule (θ∗1, ..., θ
∗
N) which solves the problem given in (12). Note that θ
∗
N
cannot be solved for without knowing θ∗N−1. Thus, Stage N begins by solving for something
of a placeholder, or opening conjecture as to what θ∗N might be. Let,
θ∗N(N) = arg max
θN
piN(θN). (2.13)
The search for the optimal schedule begins with θ∗N(N). It is denoted θ
∗
N(N) to reflect that
it is the Stage N candidate for θ∗N . As the search for the solution continues, the candidate
for θ∗N may need to be modified to maintain implementability, depending on what value θN−1
takes. Let the best (profit maximizing and implementable) response of θN to any value of
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the state variable θN−1 be,
θBRN |N−1(θN−1) ≡ arg max
θN≥θN−1
piN(θN),∀θN−1 ∈ [θ, θ]. (2.14)
For any θN−1 ≤ θ∗N(N), the best response is clearly θ∗N(N). Also, by (A3), piN is decreasing
in θN on the interval [θ
∗
N(N), θ]. Therefore the best response of θN to any value of the state
variable θN−1 is,
θBRN |N−1(θN−1) = max[θ
∗
N(N), θN−1]. (2.15)
This best response of θN to any choice of θN−1, allows the maximum profit in the N th market,
given any choice of θN−1, to be expressed as a value function,
VN(θN−1) ≡ max
θN≥θN−1
piN(θN) = piN(θ
BR
N |N−1(θN−1)). (2.16)
2.3.2 Stage N-1
As in the preceding stage, the Stage N − 1 objective is to find an opening conjecture
for θ∗N−1 as well as an updated candidate for θ
∗
N . These will be denoted as θ
∗
N−1(N − 1) and
θ∗N(N − 1), respectively. The Stage N − 1 candidates for θ∗N−1 and θ∗N will be,
arg max
θN−1≤θN
[piN−1(θN−1) + piN(θN)] (2.17)
Assuming a best response of θN to any choice of θN−1, the initial candidate for θ∗N−1 is then
θ∗N−1(N − 1) = arg max
θN−1
[piN−1(θN−1) + VN(θN−1)]. (2.18)
This in turn implies the updated candidate for θ∗N ,
θ∗N(N − 1) = θBRN |N−1(θ∗N−1(N − 1)) = max[θ∗N(N), θ∗N−1(N − 1)]. (2.19)
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The final step of (2.19) follows from (2.15).
As the search continues, the candidate for θ∗N−1 might need to be modified to satisfy
monotonicity, depending on the value that state variable θN−2 takes. Additionally, if the
θ∗N−1 candidate is modified in response to state variable θN−2, then the candidate for θ
∗
N
might need to be modified in response to the θ∗N−1 candidate response. Assuming a best
response of θN to θN−1, the best response of θN−1 to any value of state variable θN−2, is,
θBRN−1|N−2(θN−2) = arg max
θN−1≥θN−2
[piN−1(θN−1) + VN(θN−1)]. (2.20)
Implicit in (2.20) is a best response of θN to the best response of θN−1 to θN−2. This
composition of two best response functions, is the best response of θN to state variable θN−2,
which is denoted by θBRN |N−2(θN−2).
Assumption (A3) implies that VN is concave in θN−1 on [θ, θ]. Since piN−1 and VN
are both concave in θN−1 on the same range, it follows that the sum of those two functions
is concave in θN−1 on that range. By the same reasoning used to express θBRN |N−1(θN−1) in
(2.15),
θBRN−1|N−2(θN−2) = max[θ
∗
N−1(N − 1), θN−2]. (2.21)
Using (2.21), a similar expression for θBRN |N−2(θN−2) can be derived as follows,
θBRN |N−2(θN−2) = θ
BR
N |N−1(θ
BR
N−1|N−2(θN−2)) = θ
BR
N |N−1(max[θ
∗
N−1(N − 1), θN−2]). (2.22)
Using the function θBRN |N−1 from (2.15) gives,
θBRN |N−2(θN−2) = max{θ∗N(N),max[θ∗N−1(N − 1), θN−2]}. (2.23)
Note that maxima have a distributive property such that,
max{θ∗N(N),max[θ∗N−1(N − 1), θN−2]} = max{max[θ∗N(N), θ∗N−1(N − 1)], θN−2}. (2.24)
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Recognizing (max[θ∗N(N), θ
∗
N−1(N − 1)]) as the Stage N − 1 candidate for θ∗N , it follows that
the best response of θN to any value of state variable θN−2 is then,
θBRN |N−2(θN−2) = max[θ
∗
N(N − 1), θN−2]. (2.25)
Assuming best responses of θN−1 and θN , the maximum possible piN−1 + piN as function of
θN−2 is then,
VN−1(θN−2) = piN−1(θBRN−1|N−2(θN−2)) + VN(θ
BR
N−1|N−2(θN−2)). (2.26)
From (2.16) note that
VN(θ
BR
N−1|N−2(θN−2)) = piN [θ
BR
N |N−1(θ
BR
N−1|N−2(θN−2))] = piN(θ
BR
N |N−2(θN−2)). (2.27)
Thus the value function in (2.27) can be rewritten as
VN−1(θN−2) = piN−1(θBRN−1|N−2(θN−2)) + piN(θ
BR
N |N−2(θN−2)). (2.28)
Naturally the value function VN−1 sets up Stage N−2 and the solution by backward induction
continues, with each remaining stage solved in the same manner just shown for Stage N − 1.
From here, discussion of the solution is generalized to any such stage.
2.3.3 General Stage
For any j < N , the Stage j + 1 objective is to find an initial candidate θ∗j+1 as well
as updated candidates for (θ∗j+2, .., θ
∗
N). The Stage j + 1 candidates will be,
arg max
θj≤···≤θN
N∑
i=j+1
pii(θi). (2.29)
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The value function Vj+2 is defined,
Vj+2(θj+1) ≡ max
θj+1≤θj+2≤···≤θN
N∑
k=j+2
pik(θk) =
N∑
k=j+2
pik(θ
BR
k|j (θj)). (2.30)
Assuming best responses of (θj+2, ..., θN) to any choice of θj, the initial candidate for θ
∗
j+1 is
then,
θ∗j+1(j + 1) = arg max
θj+1
[pij+1(θj+1) + Vj+2(θj+1)]. (2.31)
Implicit in (2.31) are updated candidates for (θ∗j+2, ..., θ
∗
N), which are,
θ∗k(j + 1) = θ
BR
k|j+1(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)),∀k > j + 1. (2.32)
The initial candidate θ∗j+1(j+ 1) may need to be modified to satisfy the monotonicity
condition, depending on the value that state variable θj. The best response of θj+1 to any
value of θj is then,
θBRj+1|1(θj) = arg max
θj+1≥θj
[pij+1(θj+1) + Vj+2(θj+1)]. (2.33)
By Assumption (A3), pij+1 and Vj+2 are both concave in θj+1 on [θ, θ], which implies that
pij+1 + Vj+2 is concave in θj+1 on the same range. It follows that,
θBRj+1|j(θj) = max[θ
∗
j+1(j + 1), θj]. (2.34)
From (2.34), a proof by induction shows that the best response function of θk to state vari-
able θj have a similar form, for all k ≥ j + 1.
Proposition 1. θBRk|j (θj) = max[θ
∗
k(j + 1), θj],∀k ≥ j + 1.
Proof. To initialize, note that by (2.34), the proposition is true for k = j + 1. Note also
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that,
θBRk|j (θj) = θ
BR
k|k−1(θ
BR
k−1|j(θj)). (2.35)
Next, for any k > j + 1, assume that the proposition is true for k − 1. From (2.35),
it then follows that,
θBRk|j (θj) = θ
BR
k|k−1(max[θ
∗
k−1(j + 1), θj]) = max{θ∗k(k),max[θ∗k−1(j + 1), θj]}. (2.36)
The first step of (2.36) follows from the inductive assumption. The second step follows from
(2.34) with k replacing j + 1. Next, maximums have a distributive property such that,
θBRk|j (θj) = max{θ∗k(k),max[θ∗k−1(j + 1), θj]} = max{max[θ∗k(k), θ∗k−1(j + 1)], θj}. (2.37)
Finally note that,
max[θ∗k(k), θ
∗
k−1(j + 1)] = θ
BR
k|k−1[θ
∗
k−1(j + 1)] = θ
BR
k|k−1[θ
BR
k−1|j+1(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1))]
= θBRk|j+1(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)) = θ
∗
k(j + 1).
(2.38)
The first step of (2.38) is implied by (2.34) with k replacing j + 1. The second follows from
(2.32), with k − 1 replacing k and j + 1 replacing j. The third step follows from (2.35),
and the final step follows from (2.32), with j + 1 replacing j. Substituting (2.38) into (2.37)
gives,
θBRk|j (θj) = max{θ∗k(j + 1), θj}. (2.39)
Thus if the proposition is true for any k−1 ≥ j+1, it is true for k. Therefore the proposition
is true for all k ≥ j + 1, since it is true for k = j + 1. QED
Assuming optimal responses of (θj+1, ..., θN) to state variable θj, the value function
Vj+1 is,
Vj+1(θj) = pij+1[θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)] + Vj+2[θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)] =
N∑
k=j+1
pik(θ
BR
k|j (θj)). (2.40)
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2.3.3.1 The Optimal Schedule
The monopolist’s optimal schedule is solved in Stage 1. The initial candidate for θ∗1
is,
θ∗1(1) = arg max
θ1
[pi1(θ1) + V2(θ1)]. (2.41)
This implies Stage 1 candidates for (θ∗2, ..., θ
∗
N), which are,
θ∗k(1) = θ
BR
k|1 (θ
∗
1(1)),∀k = 2, ..., N. (2.42)
By construction (θ∗1(1), ..., θ
∗
N(1)) belongs to the feasible set given by (2.11), in other words,
it satisfies the monotonicity constraint. Therefore it is the solution to the monopolist’s
problem (2.12),
(θ∗1(1), ..., θ
∗
N(1)) = (θ
∗
1, ..., θ
∗
N). (2.43)
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2.4 Optimal Ironing
An ironed region of a monopolist’s optimal schedule is a sequence of markets over
which the optimal marginal type is constant. That is, if the monopolist’s optimal schedule
is ironed from the jth to the kth market, then,
(θ∗j = · · · = θ∗k). (2.44)
This constant portion of the monopolist’s schedule reflects a bunching of units j through k at
a single consumer type. That is, the monopolist is making a single consumer type indifferent
between a bundle of j units and bundle of k units.
Recall that the multi-market approach employed here, treats each unit as a different
good that the monopolist sells in an independent market. The markets however depend on
each other through the monotonicity constraint. It is this dependence that the backward
induction approach builds into the solution. If the monopolist’s optimal schedule is such that
the monotonicity constraint does not bind, then the N markets are effectively independent
or separable. That is, nothing would be lost from the ad hoc approach of searching for N
different marginal types θi, to maximize N different market profit functions pii. However,
when the monopolist’s optimal monotonic schedule contains ironed regions as in (2.44), this
indicates that the jth through to kth markets should not be treated as independent. Sepa-
rately solving for optimal types in these markets will lead to a violation of the monotonicity
constraint. Instead, it turns out to be optimal for the monopolist to chose only one marginal
type for this sequence of markets, to maximize the sum of profits from sale of the jth to
the kth market. In this section, I establish that the backward induction approach identifies
the inseparable markets and chooses a constant marginal type that is optimal over them.
This optimal type, in turn, is shown to satisfy a “summation condition”. If the monopolist’s
optimal schedule is such that (θ∗j−1 < θ
∗
j = θ
∗
j+1 = · · · = θ∗k < θ∗k+1), then θ∗j = · · · = θ∗k = θˆ,
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where,
k∑
i=j
pi′i(θˆ) = 0. (2.45)
This summation condition is Proposition 5 below. First, I prove three propositions that will
help to show the summation condition.
Proposition 2. For all j < k ≤ N , the derivative of the best response function θBRk|j (θj)
with respect to θj is,
(θBRk|j )
′(θj) =
 0, θj < θ
∗
k(j + 1)
1, θj > θ
∗
k(j + 1)
 .
Proof is immediate from Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. For all j < N , Vj+1(θj) is continuously differentiable with respect to θj,
and this derivative is given by,
V ′j+1(θj) =
 0, θj ≤ θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)
pi′j+1(θj) + V
′
j+2(θj), θj ≥ θ∗j+1(j + 1)

.
Proof. First, note that by the first order condition for θ∗j+1(j + 1),
pi′j+1(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)) + V
′
j+2(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)) = 0. (2.46)
Next, recall that Vj+1 can be expressed,
Vj+1(θj) = pij+1(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)) + Vj+2(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)). (2.47)
The derivative of Vj+1 with respect to θj is then,
V ′j+1(θj) = [pi
′
j+1(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)) + V
′
j+2(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj))] · (θBRj+1|j)′(θj),∀θj 6= θ∗j+1(j + 1). (2.48)
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It follows from Proposition 2, that for all θj < θ
∗
j+1(j + 1),
V ′j+1(θj) = [pi
′
j+1(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj)) + V
′
j+2(θ
BR
j+1|j(θj))] · (0) = 0. (2.49)
By Propositions 1 and 2, for all θj > θ
∗
j+1(j + 1),
V ′j+1(θj) = [pi
′
j+1(θj) + V
′
j+2(θj)] · (1) = pi′j+1(θj) + V ′j+2(θj). (2.50)
To establish that this derivative is continuous at θ∗j+1(j + 1), note that from (2.49),
limθj↑θ∗j+1(j+1) V
′
j+1(θj) = 0. (2.51)
From (2.50) it can be seen that,
limθj↓θ∗j+1(j+1) V
′
j+1(θj) = pi
′
j+1(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)) + V
′
j+2(θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)) = 0. (2.52)
Therefore, for all j < N , Vj+1 is continuously differentiable with respect to θj, and this
derivative is given by,
V ′j+1(θj) =
 0, θj ≤ θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)
pi′j+1(θj) + V
′
j+2(θj), θj ≥ θ∗j+1(j + 1)
 . (2.53)
QED
Proposition 4. For all j < N , Vj+1(θj) is continuously differentiable with respect to θj,
and this derivative is given by,
V ′j+1(θj) =
 0, θj ≤ θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)
pi′j+1(θj) + V
′
j+2(θj), θj ≥ θ∗j+1(j + 1)

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. By Proposition 3, Vj+2 is continuously differentiable with respect to θj, and this derivative
is given by,
V ′j+2(θj) =
 0, θj ≤ θ
∗
j+2(j + 1)
pi′j+2(θj) + V
′
j+3(θj), θ
∗
j+2(j + 1) ≤ θj
 . (2.54)
Substituting (2.54) into (2.53) gives,
V ′j+1(θj) =

0, θj ≤ θ∗j+1(j + 1)
pi′j+1(θj), θ
∗
j+1(j + 1) ≤ θj ≤ θ∗j+2(j + 1),
pi′j+1(θj) + pi
′
j+2(θj) + V
′
j+3(θj), θ
∗
j+2(j + 1) ≤ θj
 . (2.55)
Thus for any j < k ≤ N , evaluated at θj such that θ∗k(j + 1) ≤ θj < θ∗k+1(j + 1), it follows
from Proposition 3 that
V ′k(θj) = pi
′
k(θj) + V
′
k+1(θj) = pi
′
k(θj) + 0 = pi
′
k(θj). (2.56)
Therefore, Vj+1 is continuously differentiable with respect to θj, and the derivative is given
by,
V ′j+1(θj) =
 0, θj ≤ θ
∗
j+1(j + 1)∑k
i=j+1 pi
′
i(θj), θ
∗
k(j + 1) ≤ θj < θ∗k+1(j + 1)
 . (2.57)
QED
Proposition 5 (summation condition). For some 1 ≤ j < k ≤ N , if the monopolist’s
solution is such that θ∗j−1 < θ
∗
j = θ
∗
j+1 · · · = θ∗k = θˆ < θ∗k+1, then,
k∑
i=j
pi′i(θˆ) = 0.
Proof. The monopolist’s optimal schedule is given by the Stage 1 candidates from the so-
lution by backward induction. That is, (θ∗1, ..., θ
∗
N) = (θ
∗
1(1), ..., θ
∗
N(1)). By showing that the
proposition’s assumption implies that (θ∗j (1), ..., θ
∗
N(1)) = (θ
∗
j (j), ..., θ
∗
N(j)), the proposition
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can be proved using Proposition 4, and the first order condition for θ∗j (j).
First, recall that,
θ∗j (1) = θ
BR
j|1 (θ
∗
1(1)) = θ
BR
j|j−1[θ
BR
j−1|1(θ
∗
1(1))] = θ
BR
j|j−1(θ
∗
j−1(1)) = max[θ
∗
j (j), θ
∗
j−1(1)]. (2.58)
Since θ∗j (1) > θ
∗
j−1(1), then it must be the case that
θ∗j (1) = max[θ
∗
j (j), θ
∗
j−1(1)] = θ
∗
j (j). (2.59)
It follows that for all k > j,
θ∗k(1) = θ
BR
k|j (θ
∗
j (1)) = θ
BR
k|j (θ
∗
j (j)) = θ
∗
k(j). (2.60)
Therefore it has been established that, (θ∗j (1), ..., θ
∗
N(1)) = (θ
∗
j (j), ..., θ
∗
N(j)).
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From the assumption of the proposition, it follows that (θ∗j (j) = · · · = θ∗k(j) <
θ∗k+1(j)). This along with Proposition 4 imply that V
′
j+1(θj) evaluated at θ
∗
j (j), is given by,
V ′j+1(θ
∗
j (j)) =
k∑
i=j+1
pi′i(θ
∗
j (j)). (2.61)
By the first order condition for θ∗j (j),
pi′j(θ
∗
j (j)) + V
′
j+1(θ
∗
j (j)) = pi
′
j(θ
∗
j (j)) +
k∑
i=j+1
pi′i(θ
∗
j (j)) = 0. (2.62)
Finally, recall that (θ∗j (j), ..., θ
∗
k(j)) = (θ
∗
j (1), ..., θ
∗
k(1)) = (θ
∗
j , ..., θ
∗
k). By assumption
the monopolist’s optimal schedule is such that (θ∗j = · · · = θ∗k = θˆ). Therefore, (2.62) implies
that
k∑
i=j
pi′i(θ
∗
j (j)) =
k∑
i=j
pi′i(θ
∗
i ) =
k∑
i=j
pi′i(θˆ) = 0. (2.63)
QED
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CHAPTER 3
MONOPOLY PRICING UNDER SINGLE CROSSING VIOLATIONS
In this chapter, I look at the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolist screening con-
sumers on a single “type” parameter, when the single crossing (or Spence-Mirrlees) condition
is violated.1 Following Araujo et al. (2011), and Schottmu¨ller (2015), I focus on one-time
violations of this condition. I show that under standard assumptions of one-dimensional
screening problems, violation of the single crossing condition can allow for positive and glob-
ally incentive compatible assignments through which the monopolist extracts all equilibrium
surplus. That is, the monopolist can implement positive assignments such that individual
rationality constraints bind for all consumer types at their respective assignments. This
assignment schedule is formally introduced as Qx(θ) in Section 3.3. In that section, Propo-
sition 1B is proven to show that an uninformed monopolist can implement this schedule and
extract all surplus from the resulting allocation.2
Note, that this implementable assignment schedule, which extracts all equilibrium
surplus, is not necessarily the monopolist’s optimal assignment schedule. I say that this
schedule extracts all equilibrium surplus to emphasize that; while this assignment schedule
does extract all social welfare from its resulting allocation, it does not necessarily maximize
social welfare. This assignment schedule will, however, often be a component of the monop-
olist’s optimal assignment schedule.
The existence of an assignment schedule that is implementable with binding indi-
vidual rationality constraints for all consumer types, sharply contrasts with the case of
1See Mirrlees (1971) and Spence (1973)
2By referring to the monopolist as “uninformed”, I mean that consumers are privately informed of their
type.
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second-degree price discrimination when the single crossing condition is satisfied. When
the single crossing condition holds, such an assignment schedule can only be implemented
when consumer type is known to the monopolist and he practices perfect first-degree price
discrimination. If consumers are privately informed of their type, the individual rationality
constraint can bind only for the lowest type receiving a positive assignment. All higher types
will receive informational rents. Thus, relaxation of the single crossing condition can have
substantial implications for nonlinear pricing.
I show that in a special scenario, the implementable and total equilibrium surplus
extracting assignment schedule (later denoted Qx(θ)), is also the monopolist’s optimal as-
signment schedule. In that scenario, the monopolist’s marginal cost function is such that
this assignment schedule assigns “first-best” quantities to all consumer types, and thus is
also socially efficient. Note that when the single crossing condition holds, the monopolist’s
optimal assignment schedule is socially efficient only when he is informed of his consumers’
types (perfect first-degree price discrimination).
Finally, I evaluate how this assignment schedule, which is implementable and extracts
all equilibrium surplus, relates to the monopolist’s optimal assignment schedule in more gen-
eral cases. I argue that it composes part of the monopolist’s optimal assignment schedule
under a wide range of conditions.
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3.1 Model
I model the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolist producing a single good q at
a cost c(q). For simplicity, I assume a constant marginal cost, c(q) = cq. The monopolist
offers a menu of quantity bundles and corresponding prices to a set of consumers with het-
erogeneous preferences for the good. The total price of q units is given by P (q) =
∫ q
0
p(v)dv,
where p(q) = P ′(q), is the marginal price of the qth unit.
Consumer preferences are differentiated by a single parameter, their “type” θ ∈
[θ
¯
, θ¯] = Θ, of which they are privately informed. According to the monopolist’s prior proba-
bility distribution, type θ has probability density f(θ). The cumulative distribution function,
evaluated at θ, is given by
F (θ) =
θ∫
θ
¯
f(t)dt. (3.1)
Consumer utility u = u(θ, q) is a function of the quantity consumed and the consumer’s type.
Before introducing the assumptions of the model, it will help to establish some notation.
For a given type of consumer θ, let q0(θ) be the minimum quantity for which the
marginal utility of type θ, denoted uq(θ, q), is equal to zero. That is,
q0(θ) ≡ inf{q : uq(θ, q) = 0}. (3.2)
For all consumer types, assume uq(θ, q) is decreasing in quantity over [0, q0(θ)], and equal to
zero for all q ≥ q0(θ). If uq(θ, q) > 0 for all q > 0, then q0(θ) =∞.
Assumption (A1): uqq(θ, q) < 0, for all q < q0(θ), and all θ in Θ.
Let q¯(θ) denote the quantity at which the marginal utility for type θ is exactly equal
to marginal cost. That is, q = q¯(θ) solves
uq(θ, q) = c. (3.3)
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The assumptions of constant marginal cost and decreasing marginal utility imply that q¯(θ)
is a unique quantity.
Finally, for any θA 6= θB, let qx(θA, θB) denote a quantity at which the marginal
utility curves of types θA and θB intersect. Note that such a quantity may not exist. The
Spence-Mirrlees or single crossing condition (henceforth SCC) implies that marginal utility
is increasing in type for all quantities, in which case qx(θA, θB) does not exist for all θA 6= θB.
Single Crossing Condition (SCC): uqθ(θ, q) > 0, ∀q ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ. (3.4)
Thus, when the SCC is satisfied,
∀θA 6= θB ∈ Θ, 6 ∃ q such that uq(θˆ, q) = uq(θ, q). (3.5)
In this paper, I relax the SCC and focus on a specific violation where the marginal
utility curves intersect exactly once for every pair of types in Θ. The type parameter θ,
which under the SCC orders consumer preferences over all quantities of the good, will instead
order consumer preferences only over initial quantities. That is, consumers with higher θ
have higher marginal utilities for initial amounts of the good, but their marginal utilities also
decrease at faster rates. To avoid potential confusion, I will refer to consumers with greater
values of θ as “steeper” types, and consumers with lesser values of θ as “flatter” types.3
Assumption (A2): For all θ in Θ, uqθ(θ, q)|q=0 > 0. For all θ in Θ and q > 0, uθθ(θ, q) < 0,
uqqθ(θ, q) < 0, and uqθθ(θ, q) < 0.
3The conventional “high” and “low” type terminology is less appropriate when the SCC is violated, since,
e.g., in this paper, consumers with higher θ ultimately demand less of the good than consumers with lower
θ.
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Assumption (A3): For all θA > θB in Θ, there exists a quantity 0 < qx(θA, θB) < q¯(θA),
such that: ∀q ∈ [0, qx(θA, θB)], uq(θA, q) ≥ uq(θB, q), and ∀q > qx(θA, θB), uq(θA, q) ≤
uq(θ
B, q).
These assumptions imply a one-time violation of the SCC for every pair of types
in Θ. Note also that, since qx(θA, θB) is assumed less than q¯(θA) < q0(θ), it follows that
q¯(θA) < q¯(θB), and q0(θ
A) < q0(θ
B), for all θA > θB in Θ. That is, steeper types are willing
to pay more for initial quantities, but willing to buy less q overall at a marginal prices of c
and zero.
A pair consisting of a marginal price schedule and an assignment schedule, is imple-
mentable if the incentive compatibility (henceforth IC) constraint is satisfied for all types in
Θ. An implementable marginal price and assignment schedule pair is feasible if the individ-
ual rationality (henceforth IR) constraints are satisfied for all types in Θ. The IC and IR
constraints for type θ are given by ICC(θ) and IRC(θ) as follows:
ICC(θ): u(θ, x(θ))− P (x(θ)) ≥ u(θ, x(θ′))− P (x(θ′)), ∀θ′ ∈ Θ.
IRC(θ): u(θ, x(θ))− P (x(θ)) ≥ 0.
The monopolist chooses a feasible and implementable pair (p(q), x(θ)) to maximize
profit. That is, he maximizes profit subject to the ICC(θ) and IRC(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. The
monopolist’s profit function for a pair (p(q), x(θ)), is given by
Π =
θ¯∫
θ
¯
f(t)
 x(t)∫
0
[p(v)− c] dv
 dt = θ¯∫
θ
¯
[(P (x(t)− c · x(t)))f(t)]dt. (3.6)
3.1.1 Consumer Surplus Under Marginal Cost Pricing
Suppose the monopolist were regulated such that p(q) = cq for all q > 0. All θ ∈ Θ
will purchase q¯(θ) and receive a surplus. Let C˜S(θ, q¯(θ)) represent the first-best consumer
surplus that type θ receives under the hypothetical imposition of marginal cost pricing. That
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is,
C˜S(θ, q¯(θ)) ≡
q¯(θ)∫
0
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv = u(θ, q¯(θ))− c · q¯(θ). (3.7)
This hypothetical first-best consumer surplus helps to illustrate how the monopolist’s opti-
mal pricing behavior can dramatically differ when the SCC is violated.
In standard price discrimination models, where the SCC holds, higher consumer types
have larger first-best quantities, and higher utilities at first-best quantities. Consequently,
the monopolist’s optimal price and assignment schedules exhibit well-known properties when
the SCC holds. Most notably, the monopolist must pay informational rents to induce con-
sumers to truthfully reveal their type. This is a consequence of the monopolist’s imperfect
information. The IR constraint binds at the assigned quantity only for the lowest type served
(i.e. the lowest type served receives no informational rent). All other types served receive
informational rents, and the rent is increasing in type. This is because the monopolist must
prevent higher types from pretending they are lower types, but typically needn’t worry about
lower types pretending to be higher types. Finally, the highest type is the only type assigned
her first-best quantity, x(θ) = q¯(θ), giving the “no distortion at the top” property.
When the SCC is violated, the monopolist’s optimal marginal price and assignment
schedules can produce some markedly different results. The violation of the SCC specified
by assumptions (A2) and (A3), implies that q¯(θ) is instead decreasing in θ. Thus, the hypo-
thetical first-best surplus C˜S(θ, q¯(θ)) may be increasing, decreasing, or constant in consumer
type. Under the SCC violation, incentive compatibility can have a variety of implications,
because flatter types may be willing to pay more, less, or the same amount as steeper types,
for greater assignments of the good. When the SCC is violated, the monopolist’s optimal
marginal price and assignment schedules can result in allocations with characteristics very
different from those discussed in the preceding paragraph. In one such scenario (discussed
in Section 3.2), the monopolist’s optimal assignment schedule offers the first-best, q¯(θ) to all
θ in Θ. This is a “no distortion from top to bottom” result, if you will.
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3.2 Scenario 1: Constant First-Best Surplus
Consider a scenario where C˜S(θ, q¯(θ)) is the same across all types in Θ. That is,
Scenario 1: C˜S(θ, q¯(θ)) = C˜S(θ′, q¯(θ′)), ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. (3.8)
In this scenario the monopolist’s optimal marginal price schedule is surprisingly straightfor-
ward. The monopolist can extract all first-best surplus from consumers with the marginal
price schedule
p(q) =
 uq(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, q¯(θ¯)]c, q ≥ q¯(θ¯)
 . (3.9)
That is, the marginal price is equated to the highest type’s marginal utility up to q¯(θ¯) units,
and marginal price is equated to marginal cost thereafter. See Figure 3.1.
The assignment schedule of quantities to types, implied by (3.9), is
x(θ) = q¯(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.10)
I will show that the marginal price schedule and the assignment schedule given by (3.9)
and (3.10) respectively, are incentive compatible and satisfy the IR constraints for all types,
making (3.9) and (3.10) implementable, and feasible. I will also show that for all types,
the IR constraint is binding at the type’s assigned quantity x(θ) = q¯(θ). Since all types
are assigned their first-best quantities it follows that the marginal price and assignment
schedules (3.9) and (3.10) maximize social welfare, and since the IR constraint binds for all
types, all of this social welfare is extracted by the monopolist. From this, it is immediate
that (3.9) and (3.10) are the monopolist’s optimal marginal price and assignment schedules
under Scenario 1.
Proposition 1A. If hypothetical first-best surplus is constant in θ over Θ, the marginal price
schedule given in (3.9), and the implicit assignment schedule given in (3.10), are incentive
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Figure 3.1. Marginal Price Scedule (constant first-best surplus)
compatible for all θ in Θ. Additionally, the IR constraint is binding at x(θ) = q¯(θ), for all θ
in Θ.
Proof. First, for a given total price schedule P (q), the consumer surplus that type θ actually
gets from consuming q units is denoted CS(θ, q), and given by
CS(θ, q) = u(θ, q)− P (q). (3.11)
Note that the actual consumer surplus given in (3.11), is a different function than the
hypothetical first-best surplus defined in (3.7), as indicated by the removal of the tilde in
(3.11). Each consumer type solves
max
q>0
[CS(θ, q) = u(θ, q)− P (q)], (3.12)
and then purchases the quantity solving (3.12) if it satisfies their IR constraint.
Consider first the steepest consumer type, θ¯. It is immediate from (3.9) that CS(θ¯, q)
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is equal to zero for all q ≤ q¯(θ¯). Therefore, for any q > q¯(θ¯),
CS(θ¯, q) = [u(θ¯, q¯(θ¯))−P (q¯(θ¯))] +
q∫
q¯(θ¯)
uq(θ¯, v)dv−
q∫
q¯(θ¯)
cdv =
q∫
q¯(θ¯)
uq(θ¯, v)dv−
q∫
q¯(θ¯)
cdv, (3.13)
where the second step of (3.13) makes use of [u(θ¯, q¯(θ¯)) − P (q¯(θ¯))] = 0. By definition
uq(θ¯, q¯(θ¯)) = c, and uq(θ, q) is decreasing in q over [q¯(θ¯), q0(θ¯)] and equal to 0 thereafter
by Assumption (A1). It follows then that uq(θ¯, q) is strictly less than c for any q greater
than q¯(θ¯). Therefore, CS(θ¯, q) is equal to 0 for all q ≤ x(θ¯) = q¯(θ¯), and less than 0 for all
q > x(θ¯) = q¯(θ¯). Thus, θ¯ weakly prefers her assignment to any other positive quantity. Note
also that her IR constraint is binding at her assigned quantity, since CS(θ¯, q¯(θ¯)) = 0.
Turning now to θ less than θ¯, consider the derivative of CS(θ, q) with respect to q,
given by
∂[u(θ, q)− P (q)]
∂q
=
 uq(θ, q)− uq(θ¯, q), 0 < q ≤ q¯(θ¯)uq(θ, q)− c, q > q¯(θ¯)
 , (3.14)
and shown in the lower panel of Figure 3.2. The first order condition for a local maximum
is satisfied at q equal qx(θ¯, θ), and q¯(θ).
The second derivative of CS(θ, q) with respect to q is given by,4
∂2[u(θ, q)− P (q)]
∂q2
=
 uqq(θ, q)− uqq(θ¯, q), 0 < q < q¯(θ¯)uqq(θ)− c, q > q¯(θ¯)
 . (3.15)
Recall that qx(θ¯, θ) is less than q¯(θ¯) by Assumption (A3), and uqq(θ, q) is greater (smaller
negative) than uqq(θ¯, q) by Assumption (A2). Thus, equation (3.15) when evaluated at
q = qx(θ¯, θ), is positive and clearly violates the second order condition for a local maximum.
Now, recall that c is a positive constant, and by Assumption (A1), uqq(θ, q) is negative
for all q > 0. Since q¯(θ) is greater than q¯(θ¯), equation (3.15) is negative when evaluated at any
4Note that the second derivative of CS(θ, q) with respect to q does not exist at q = q¯(θ¯). This can seen
in the lower panel of Figure 3.2 by the kink in CSq(θ, q) at q = q¯(θ¯).
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Figure 3.2. Derivative of CS(θ, q) with respect to q
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q > q¯(θ¯). Thus, q¯(θ) satisfies the second order condition sufficient for a local maximum. Note
however that the consumer can always choose a quantity of zero which yields a consumer
surplus of zero. In the following paragraph, I verify that the IR constraint for type θ is
satisfied at q¯(θ), which turns out to imply that q¯(θ) is a global maximum for CS(θ, q).
Turning to the IR constraints, for any θ less than θ¯, consumer surplus evaluated at
x(θ) = q¯(θ), is
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) = u(θ, q¯(θ))− P (q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ)∫
0
uq(θ, v)dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ¯, v)dv −
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
cdv. (3.16)
Recognizing that q¯(θ¯) < q¯(θ), the first integral in (3.16) can be separated into two integrals,
as
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ, v)dv +
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
uq(θ, v)dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ¯, v)dv −
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
cdv. (3.17)
Since the second and fourth integrals in (3.17) are evaluated over the same interval, they
can be combined, giving
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ, v)dv +
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ¯, v)dv. (3.18)
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Without changing the equality,
∫ q¯(θ¯)
0
cdv can be added and subtracted to the right-
hand side of (3.18), giving
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ, v)dv +
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
uq(θ¯, v)dv +
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
cdv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
cdv. (3.19)
The first, third, fourth, and fifth integrals of (3.19) are all evaluated over the same interval.
Thus, the fifth integral can be combined with the first, and the fourth integral can be
combined with the third, giving
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv +
q¯(θ)∫
q¯(θ¯)
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
[uq(θ¯, v)− c]dv. (3.20)
The first and second integrals in (3.20) have the same integrand. Since the first
integral is also evaluated over [0, q¯(θ¯)], and the second integral is evaluated over [q¯(θ¯), q¯(θ)],
they can be combined, giving
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
q¯(θ)∫
0
[uq(θ, v)− c]dv −
q¯(θ¯)∫
0
[uq(θ¯, v)− c]dv. (3.21)
Finally, recall that the first integral in (3.21) is the first-best surplus for θ, and the
second integral is the first-best surplus for θ¯. Therefore, the constant first-best surplus
condition implies that
CS(θ, q¯(θ)) = C˜S(θ, q¯(θ))− C˜S(θ¯, q¯(θ¯)) = 0, ∀θ < θ¯. (3.22)
That is, the IR constraint binds at x(θ) = q¯(θ) for all θ less than θ¯. Recall that the IR
constraint has been shown to bind for the steepest type θ¯ at q¯(θ¯). Thus, the IR constraint
binds at x(θ) = q¯(θ), for all θ in Θ.
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Recall that for all θ, CS(θ, q) was shown to have local maxima at q = 0 and q = q¯(θ).
Consumer surplus equals zero when evaluated at q = 0, and since the IR constraint binds at
q¯(θ), consumer surplus equals zero when evaluated at q = q¯(θ). Thus, q = 0 and q = q¯(θ) are
both global maxima, and all θ in Θ weakly prefer their assignment x(θ) = q¯(θ) to any other
q ≥ 0. Therefore, the marginal price schedule given in (3.9) and the assignment schedule
given in (3.10), are globally incentive compatible, and the IR constraint binds at x(θ) = q¯(θ),
for all θ in Θ. QED
Corolarry 1A. If the hypothetical first-best surplus is constant for in θ over Θ, the marginal
price schedule given in (3.9), and the assignment schedule given in (3.10), are optimal for
the monopolist, and the resulting allocation is socially efficient.
Proof. First-best assignments x(θ) = q¯(θ) for all θ in Θ, maximize social welfare. By Propo-
sition 1A, the first-best assignments are globally incentive compatible and leave CS(θ, q¯(θ)) =
0, for all θ in Θ. Since all consumer types receive no surplus at their assignments, it follows
that all social welfare is extracted by the monopolist. Therefore, the pair (p(q), x(θ)) speci-
fied by (3.9) and (3.10) must be optimal for the monopolist, and the resulting allocation is
socially efficient. QED
85
3.3 Two Important Functions of Quantity and Type
In this section, I introduce two functions which map types to quantities and help to
understand the monopolist’s problem. Recall that for θA > θB, qx(θA, θB) was introduced
as the quantity such that uq(θ
A, q) = uq(θ
B, q), while uq(θ
A, q) is greater than uq(θ
B, q) for
quantities less than qx(θA, θB), and uq(θ
A, q) is less than or equal to uq(θ
B, q) for quantities
greater than qx(θA, θB). Consider a simple extension of this concept, denoted qx(θ). For
each type, qx(θ) < q0(θ) is the quantity at which the cross-partial derivative of the utility
function is equal to zero. That is,
uqθ(θ, q
x(θ)) = 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.23)
Another way to think of qx(θ) is as qx(θ, θ+dθ), using the notation from Section 3.1. Figure
3.3 shows that qx(θ) is a threshold which divides the (θ, q) plane into two regions. Marginal
utility is constant in type along qx(θ). In the region below qx(θ), marginal utility is increas-
ing in type over [θ
¯
, θ], and in the region above qx(θ), marginal utility is decreasing in type
over [θ, θ¯]. Notice that for q ≤ qx(θ¯), marginal utility is increasing in type over Θ, and for
q ≥ qx(θ
¯
) marginal utility is decreasing in type over Θ. That is, consumer preferences are
completely ordered by θ on [0, qx(θ¯)] and for q ≥ qx(θ
¯
).
The function denoted in this paper as qx(θ), is the function denoted “q0(θ)” in
Araujo et al. (2011), and denoted “s(θ)” by Schottmu¨ller (2015). Both Araujo et al. (2011)
and Schottmu¨ller (2015) focus on qx(θ) in relation to the first-best quantity schedule q¯(θ).
Schottmu¨ller (2015) deals only with cases where qx(θ) lies entirely above q¯(θ). Araujo et al.
(2011) deal with cases where qx(θ) and q¯(θ) intersect once. An implication of qx(θ) and q¯(θ)
crossing once is that implementable assignment schedules will not be monotonic. Following
Schottmu¨ller (2015), I focus on cases where q¯(θ) lies entirely above qx(θ), or,
q¯(θ) > qx(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.24)
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Figure 3.3. The threshold qx(θ)
This is implicit in Assumption (A3).
Lemma 1. qx(θ) is decreasing in θ over Θ.
Proof. By definition,
uqθ(θ, q
x(θ)) = 0. (3.25)
Implicitly differentiating (3.25) with respect to θ gives
uqθθ(θ, q
x(θ)) + uqqθ(θ, q
x(θ)) ·
[
(qx)
′
(θ)
]
= 0, (3.26)
where (qx)
′
(θ) denotes the derivative of qx(θ) with respect to θ.
Rearranging (3.26) gives
(qx)
′
(θ) =
−uqθθ(θ, qx(θ))
uqqθ(θ, qx(θ))
. (3.27)
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By Assumption (A2), uqθθ(θ, q
x(θ)) and uqqθ(θ, q
x(θ)) are negative. Thus, the numerator of
(3.27) becomes a positive, while the denominator remains negative. It follows that
(qx)
′
(θ) < 0. (3.28)
That is, qx(θ) is decreasing in θ over Θ. QED
Another important concept in these problems, is the division of Θ × q into regions
where total utility is increasing and decreasing in type. For each θ, let Qx(θ) denote the
quantity at which the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to θ is equal to
zero. That is,
uθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) = 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.29)
The function Qx(θ) divides the (θ, q) plane into two regions. For each θ, total utility is
increasing in type at any q < Qx(θ), constant in type at q = Qx(θ), and decreasing in type
at any q > Qx(θ). Recall that qx(θ) can be thought of as the quantity that solves5
uq(θ, q) = uq(θ ± dθ, q). (3.30)
Similarly, Qx(θ) can be thought of as the quantity at which θ has the same total utility as
those types infinitesimally close to θ. That is, Qx(θ) is the quantity that solves
u(θ, q) = u(θ ± dθ, q), (3.31)
with footnote 5 applying again to (3.31).
5 The “±” becomes a “+”, when (3.30) is evaluated at θ
¯
, and becomes a “−” when (3.30) is evaluated
at θ¯.
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Lemma 2. If Qx(θ) exists for all θ ∈ Θ, then Qx(θ) is decreasing in θ over Θ.
Proof. By definition,
uθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) = 0. (3.32)
Implicitly differentiating (3.32) with respect to θ gives
uθθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) + uqθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) ·
[
(Qx)
′
(θ)
]
= 0, (3.33)
where (Qx)
′
(θ) denotes the derivative of Qx(θ) with respect to θ. Rearranging (3.33) gives
(Qx)
′
(θ) =
−uθθ(θ,Qx(θ))
uqθ(θ,Qx(θ))
. (3.34)
By Assumption (A2), uθθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) is negative. If Qx(θ) exists, it must be greater than qx(θ).
This means that uqθ(θ,Q
x(θ)) is also negative by Assumption (A2). Thus, the numerator of
(3.34) becomes a positive, while the denominator remains negative. It follows that
(Qx)
′
(θ) < 0. (3.35)
That is, if Qx(θ) exists for all θ in Θ, then Qx(θ) is decreasing in θ over Θ. QED
Now, I turn attention to the inverse function of Qx(θ). Over [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)], let θx(q)
denote the inverse function of Qx(θ). That is, θx(q) = θ solves Qx(θ) = q. In general let
x−1(q) denote the inverse function of any x(θ) that is one-to-one on Θ. I will show that
for q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)], θx(q) is the argument in Θ which maximizes u(θ, q). Expanding this
concept to all q > 0, let
θ•(q) = arg max
θ∈Θ
u(θ, q), ∀q > 0. (3.36)
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Lemma 3. If Qx(θ) is one-to-one on Θ, then arg maxθ∈Θ u(θ, q) is given by
θ•(q) =

θ¯, q ≤ Qx(θ¯)
θx(q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]
θ
¯
, q > Qx(θ
¯
)
 . (3.37)
Proof. First, for q ≤ Qx(θ¯), the derivative of total utility with respect to θ is such that
uθ(θ, q) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.38)
It follows that for any q ≤ Qx(θ¯) total utility is increasing in θ. Thus, θ•(q) = θ¯ for all
q ≤ Qx(θ¯).
Next, recall that by definition Qx(θ) is the q that solves
uθ(θ, q) = 0. (3.39)
It follows that the inverse function, θx(q), gives
uθ(θ
x(q), q) = 0, (3.40)
for q in [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]. From (3.40), note that θx(q) satisfies the first order condition for a
maximum. By Assumption (A2), uθθ(θ, q) is negative for all θ, which is the second order
condition for a global maximum at θx(q). Thus,
θ•(q) = θx(q), ∀q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]. (3.41)
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Finally, for q ≥ Qx(θ
¯
), the derivative of total utility with respect to θ is such that
uθ(θ, q) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.42)
It follows that for any q ≥ Qx(θ
¯
), total utility is decreasing in θ. Thus θ•(q) = θ
¯
for all
q ≥ Qx(θ
¯
). Therefore,
θ•(q) =

θ¯, q ≤ Qx(θ¯)
θx(q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]
θ
¯
, q > Qx(θ
¯
)
 . (3.43)
QED
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3.4 An Envelope Theorem Result
In this section, I make use of Lemma 3 to show that an assignment schedule x(θ) =
Qx(θ), can be implemented such that the IR constraints bind for all θ in Θ. Scenario 1,
covered in Section 3.2, is seen to be a special case of this result where the first-best quantities
q¯(θ) are equal to Qx(θ).
Proposition 1B.6 If Qx(θ) exists for all θ in Θ, the assignment schedule x(θ) = Qx(θ) is
implementable through the marginal price schedule
p(q) =
 uq(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, Q
x(θ¯)]
uq(θ
x(q), q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]
 ,
and the IR constraint binds at x(θ) = Qx(θ), for all θ in Θ.
Proof. Consider momentarily the following total price schedule,
P (q) =
 u(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, Q
x(θ¯)]
u(θx(q), q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]
 . (3.44)
I will show that under the price schedule given in (3.44), the IR constraint is binding at
x(θ) = Qx(θ), for all θ in Θ. Then, I will show that under (3.44), each type weakly or
strictly prefers their assignment x(θ) = Qx(θ) to any other q. Finally, I will show that the
price schedule from (3.44) is also given by the marginal price schedule p(q) stated in the
proposition.
Recall that each consumer type solves the objective,
max
q≥0
[CS(θ, q) = u(θ, q)− P (q)]. (3.45)
6This proposition is denoted 1B, since it generalizes proposition 1A from Section 3.2.
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Under the price schedule given in (3.44), consumer surplus evaluated at x(θ) = Qx(θ), is
given by
CS(θ,Qx(θ)) = u(θ,Qx(θ))− P (Qx(θ)) = u (θ,Qx(θ))− u (θx(Qx(θ)), Qx(θ)) . (3.46)
Recall that θx(q) is the inverse function of Qx(θ), meaning θx(Qx(θ)) = θ. Therefore,
equation (3.46) reduces to
CS(θ,Qx(θ)) = u (θ,Qx(θ))− u (θ,Qx(θ)) = 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.47)
That is, under the total price schedule given in (3.44), the individual rationality constraints
bind at x(θ) = Qx(θ), for all θ in Θ.
Next, recall that by Lemma 3, the value of θ that maximizes u(θ, q) is given by
θ•(q) =

θ¯, q ≤ Qx(θ¯)
θx(q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
)]
θ
¯
, q > Qx(θ
¯
)
 . (3.48)
It follows that the total price schedule given in (3.44) is also given by,
P (q) = u(θ•(q), q) = max
θ∈Θ
u(θ, q), ∀q ≤ Qx(θ
¯
). (3.49)
Since the total price schedule given in (3.44) is equal to the maxθ∈Θ u(θ˜, q) for all q ≤ Qx(θ
¯
),
it follows that
CS(θ, q) = u(θ, q)− P (q) = u(θ, q)−max
θ˜∈Θ
u(θ˜, q) ≤ 0, ∀q ≤ Qx(θ
¯
), θ ∈ Θ. (3.50)
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The IR constraint has already been shown to bind for all θ in Θ. Therefore, equation
(3.50) implies that all θ in Θ weakly prefer their assignment x(θ) = Qx(θ) to any other q in
[0, Qx(θ
¯
)]. The total price schedule given by (3.44) feasibly implements x(θ) = Qx(θ), for all
θ in Θ.
Finally, note that for q ∈ [0, Qx(θ¯)], the marginal price schedule implied by (3.44) is
given by
p(q) =
dP (q)
dq
=
d
dq
u(θ¯, q) = uq(θ¯, q). (3.51)
For q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
))], the marginal price schedule implied by (3.44) is given by
p(q) =
dP (q)
dq
=
d
dq
u(θx(q), q) = uq(θ
x(q), q) +
[
uθ(θ
x(q), q) · (θx)′(q)
]
. (3.52)
Recall that for q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θ
¯
))],
uθ(θ
x(q), q) = 0, (3.53)
by the definition of Qx(θ). It follows that equation (3.52) reduces to
p(q) = uq(θ
x(q), q) +
[
(0) · (θx)′(q)
]
= uq(θ
x(q), q), (3.54)
where (θx)
′
(q) denotes the derivative of θx(q) with respect to q. Thus, the total price schedule
given in (3.44) implements x(θ) = Qx(θ) with IR constraints binding at x(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ,
and (3.44) is also given by the marginal price schedule
p(q) =
 uq(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, Q
x(θ¯)]
uq(θ
x(q), q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯, Qx(θ
¯
))]
 . (3.55)
QED
Proposition 1B shows that when the SCC is violated as it is in this paper, it is
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possible for the monopolist to feasibly implement an assignment schedule which extracts all
equilibrium surplus, despite being uninformed of the consumer’s type. Moreover, note that
the constant first-best surplus scenario is in fact a special case where Qx(θ) = q¯(θ) for all θ
in Θ.
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3.5 Properties of Feasible and Implementable Assignment Schedules
In this section I establish two lemmas regarding properties of implementable assign-
ment schedules. Lemma 4 shows that if x(θ) is greater than qx(θ) for all θ in Θ, imple-
mentability will require that flatter types receive greater assignments. Lemma 5 shows that
at the monopolist’s optimum, the steepest consumer type, θ¯, is always served.
Lemma 4. Any assignment schedule, x(θ), that is continuously differentiable and one-to-
one on Θ, implementable by P (q), and greater than qx(θ) for all θ in Θ, will be strictly
decreasing in θ.
Proof. The objective function for each θ is given by
u(θ, q)− P (q). (3.56)
The first order condition for a maximum of this objective function, gives the following nec-
essary condition for P (q) to implement x(θ),
uq(x
−1(q), q) = p(q), q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.57)
A second order necessary condition for implementability is given by,
uqq(x
−1(q), q)− d
dq
p(q) ≤ 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.58)
This second order condition, evaluated at the marginal price schedule implied by the first
order condition, is given by
uqq(x
−1(q), q)− d
dq
uq(x
−1(q), q) ≤ 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.59)
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The derivative with respect to q of uq(x
−1(q), q) is given by
uqq(x
−1(q), q) + uqθ(x−1(q), q) ·
[
(x−1)
′
(q)
]
, (3.60)
where (x−1)
′
(q) denotes the derivative of x−1(q) with respect to q. It follows then that the
second order condition reduces to
− uqθ(x−1(q), q) ·
[
(x−1)
′
(q)
]
≤ 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.61)
Recall that uqθ(θ, q) is less than 0 at any q > q
x(θ). Since x(θ) > qx(θ) for all θ in
Θ, it follows that (−uqθ(x−1(q), q)) is strictly greater than zero over {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}, and can
therefore be divided out of (3.61) without changing the inequality. Thus, the second order
condition further reduces to
(x−1)
′
(q) ≤ 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.62)
The inverse function theorem implies that
(x−1)
′
(q) =
1
x′(θ)
. (3.63)
Therefore, (3.62) must hold as a strict inequality,7 given by
1
x′(θ)
< 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.64)
This also implies that
x
′
(θ) < 0, q ∈ {x(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. (3.65)
7The inequality must be strict since 1
x′ (θ)
can’t equal zero.
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That is x(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. QED
Lemma 5. If the monopolist’s optimal pair (p(q), x(θ)) that is both implementable and
feasible, assigns a positive quantity to θˆ, it also assigns positive quantities to all θ ∈ [θˆ, θ¯].
That is, if it is optimal to sell to a given type, then it is optimal to sell to all steeper types.
Proof. Suppose P◦(q) is an optimal total price schedule that feasibly implements x(θ) = 0
for all θ > θˆ, and x(θ) > 0 for all θ in [θ
¯
, θˆ]. If so, then I show that: (a) x(θˆ) is greater
than or equal to Qx(θˆ), (b) P◦(q) is greater than or equal to u(θˆ, q) for q ≥ Qx(θˆ), (c) the
IR constraint for θˆ binds at x(θˆ), and (d) no θ < θˆ is willing to buy a positive q ≤ Qx(θˆ).
To verify (a), recall that the IR constraint for θˆ requires P◦(x(θˆ)) to be less than or
equal to u(θˆ, x(θˆ)). Note also that uθ(θˆ, q) is greater than zero for all q < Q
x(θˆ). This means
that for all q < Qx(θˆ), u(θˆ, q) is less than u(θ, q) for some θ > θˆ. Thus, at any q < Qx(θˆ),
if P◦(q) ≤ u(θˆ, q), then P◦(q) < u(θ, q) for some θ > θˆ. Therefore, the monopolist cannot
feasibly implement a positive x(θˆ) < Qx(θˆ) as well as zero assignments for all θ > θˆ. The
assignment x(θˆ) must therefore be greater than or equal to Qx(θˆ), proving (a).
Next, note that if P◦(q) < u(θˆ, q) at q ≥ Qx(θˆ), then P (q) > u(θ + , q) for  > 0
small, by the continuity of u(θ, q) in θ. Therefore, P◦(q) must be greater than or equal to
u(θˆ, q) for all q ≥ Qx(θˆ), proving (b). It follows that the IR constraint for θˆ binds at x(θˆ),
or P◦(x(θˆ)) = u(θˆ, x(θˆ)), proving (c).
Finally, note that for q < Qx(θˆ), P◦(q) must be greater than u(θ•(q)) to prevent θ > θˆ
from buying. By Lemma 3 θ•(q) > θˆ for q < Qx(θˆ). It follows that no θ in Θ is willing to
buy q < Qx(θˆ), proving (d).
Now, consider an alternative total price schedule, denoted PA(q) and given by
PA(q) =
 u(θˆ, q), q < Q
x(θˆ)
P◦(q), q ≥ Qx(θˆ)
 . (3.66)
Since PA(q) is equal to u(θˆ, q) for all q < Q
x(θˆ), type θˆ still weakly prefers x(θˆ), to any
other quantity. Recall that u(θˆ, q) > u(θ, q) for all θ < θˆ and q < Qx(θˆ). Since PA(q) equals
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u(θˆ, q) for q < Qx(θ), and PA(q) equals P◦(q) at q = Qx(θˆ), all θ < θˆ are still unwilling to
buy a positive q < Qx(θˆ). Finally, since PA(q) is the same as the initial total price schedule
for q ≥ Qx(θˆ), it follows that all θ ≤ θˆ buy their initial assignments and pay the initial total
price. Notice however that all θ > θˆ now strictly prefer a positive q < Qx(θ) to q = 0.
All θ ≤ θˆ still buy the same amount under PA(q) as they do under P◦(q), and they
pay the same total price. Thus, the monopolist’s profit from θ ≤ θˆ remains the same under
PA(q). Additionally, all θ > θˆ now buy a positive q < Q
x(θˆ) and pay a positive total price.
It follows that the monopolist’s profit is greater under PA(q) than under P◦(q), and P◦(q)
therefore cannot be optimal. If the monopolist’s optimal assignment schedule gives x(θˆ) > 0,
then x(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θˆ. QED
99
3.6 The Monopolist’s Optimum: A preliminary characterization
The monopolist’s objective is to chose a pair (p(q), x(θ)) that is implementable, fea-
sible, and maximizes profit given by
Π =
θ¯∫
θ
¯
f(t)
 x(t)∫
0
[p(v)− c] dv
 dt. (3.67)
The monopolist’s optimal schedule that is both implementable and feasible is denoted x∗(θ).
Recall that if q¯(θ) = Qx(θ) for all θ in Θ, then x∗(θ) = Qx(θ). In any scenario where
q¯(θ) may or may not equal Qx(θ), the monopolist’s maximum profit is less than or equal to
first-best profit. If q¯(θ) ≥ Qx(θ) for all θ in Θ, then x∗(θ) should be greater than or equal
Qx(θ) for all θ in Θ. To see this, recall that for all θ in Θ, total utility is strictly increasing
in q on [0, q0(θ)]. By proposition 1B, the monopolist can feasibly implement x(θ) = Q
x(θ)
for all θ in Θ and extract all surplus from said assignment. Suppose the monopolist were to
decrease x(θ) below Qx(θ) for a given θ. The most the monopolist can possibly extract from
θ at that decreased assignment, is less than he can certainly extract from θ at the larger
Qx(θ) assignment. Thus, the direct effect on profit of assigning a quantity less than Qx(θ)
must be negative. It follows that assigning a quantity less than Qx(θ) can only be optimal
if it allows the monopolist to increase the assignment of other types and extract enough
additional surplus to dominate the direct effect.
For a given θˆ < θ¯, the monopolist can implement x(θ) > Qx(θ) for all θ ≤ θˆ through
the marginal price schedule,
p(q) =

uq(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, Qx(θ¯)]
uq(θ
x, q), q ∈ [Qx(θ¯), Qx(θˆ)]
uq(θˆ, q), q ∈ [Qx(θˆ), x(θˆ)]
uq(x
−1(q), q), q ∈ [x(θˆ), x(θ
¯
)]

. (3.68)
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Note that all θ > θˆ still prefer Qx(θ) to any other quantity, and the monopolist still extracts
all surplus from said assignments. For θ ≤ θˆ, the total price P (q) is greater than u(θ, q)
for all q < Qx(θˆ). Note also that P (q) is equal to u(θˆ, q) over [Qx(θˆ), x(θ)]. Moreover,
CS(θ, x(θ)) will be positive at x(θ) and decreasing in quantity thereafter, for all θ < θˆ.
Thus, the marginal price schedule given in (62) feasibly implements x(θ) > Qx(θ) for all
θ ≤ θˆ, while still feasibly implementing x(θ) = Qx(θ) with binding IR constraints, for all
θ > θˆ. It follows that the monopolist can increase assignments above Qx(θ) for flatter types
without decreasing assignments below Qx(θ) for steeper types.
Conversely, the monopolist can feasibly implement x(θ) > Qx(θ) for all θ ≥ θˆ through
the marginal price schedule
p(q) =
 uq(θ¯, q), q ∈ [0, x(θ¯)]uq(x−1(q), q), q ∈ [x(θ¯), x(θˆ)]
 . (3.69)
The monopolist needn’t decrease the assignments of flatter types below Qx(θ) to do so. It
follows that when q¯(θ) ≥ Qx(θ), assigning x(θ) < Qx(θ) for any θ always has a negative
direct effect, and never has a positive direct effect. Therefore, assignments strictly less than
Qx(θ) can never be optimal in these circumstances.
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